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Ever-increasingly complex artificial intelligence technology is being introduced into society, with 
ever-more impressive capabilities. As artificial intelligence advances, it will become harder to tell 
whether machines are relevantly different from human beings in terms of the moral consideration 
they are owed. This is a significant practical concern. As more advanced artificial intelligences 
become part of our daily lives, we could face moral dilemmas where we are forced to choose 
between harming a human, or harming one or several of these machines. Given these possibilities, 
we cannot withhold judgement about their moral standing until we achieve logical certainty, but need 
guidance to make decisions. I will present a pragmatic framework that will enable us to have 
sufficient evidence for decision-making, even if it does not definitively prove which entities have 
moral standing.  
 
First, I defend adopting a welfare-based moral theory, where having the capacity for well-being 
determines that a being deserves moral concern. I then argue that a desire-based theory of welfare 
is acceptable to a wide range of positions and should be adopted. It is therefore necessary to 
articulate a theory of desire, and I demonstrate by reference to discourse in ethics that a feeling-
based conception of desire is most compatible with the way ethical theory has been discussed. 
 
From there, we need to establish a test for possessing the capacity for felt desire. This can be 
accomplished by finding observed cases where a lack of specific morally-relevant phenomenal 
states inhibits the performance of a certain task in humans. If a machine can consistently exhibit the 
behaviour in question, we have evidence that it has the phenomenal states necessary for moral 
standing. With reference to recent experimental results, I present clear and testable criteria such 
that if an AI were to succeed at certain tasks, we would have a reason to treat it as though it did 
have moral standing, and demonstrate that modern-day AI has given no evidence as yet that it has 
the phenomenal experiences that would give it moral standing. The tasks in question are tests of 
moral and social aptitude. Success at these tests would not be certain proof of moral standing, but it 
would be sufficient to base our decisions on, which is the best we can hope for at the moment. 
 
Finally, I examine the practical consequences of these conclusions for our future actions. The use of 
this particular criterion has significant and interesting results that might change things significantly in 







Abstract: Ever-increasingly complex AI technology is being introduced into society, 
with ever-more impressive capabilities. As AI tech advances, it will become harder to 
tell whether machines are relevantly different from human beings in terms of the 
moral consideration they are owed. This is a significant practical concern. As more 
advanced AIs become part of our daily lives, we could face moral dilemmas where we 
are forced to choose between harming a human, or harming one or several of these 
machines. Given these possibilities, we cannot withhold judgement about AI moral 
standing until we achieve logical certainty, but need guidance to make decisions. I 
will present a pragmatic framework that will enable us to have sufficient evidence for 
decision-making, even if it does not definitively prove which entities have moral 
standing.  
First, I defend adopting a welfarist moral theory, where having the capacity for well-
being determines that a being has moral standing. I then argue that a desire-based 
theory of welfare is acceptable to a wide range of positions and should be adopted. It 
is therefore necessary to articulate a theory of desire, and I demonstrate by reference 
to discourse in ethics that a phenomenological conception of desire is most 
compatible with the way ethical theory has been discussed. 
From there, we need to establish a test for possessing the capacity for 
phenomenological desire. This can be accomplished by finding observed cases where 
a lack of specific morally-relevant phenomenal states inhibits the performance of a 
certain task in humans. If a machine can consistently exhibit the behaviour in 
question, we have evidence that it has the phenomenal states necessary for moral 
standing. With reference to recent experimental results, I present clear and testable 
criteria such that if an AI were to succeed at certain tasks, we would have a reason to 
treat it as though it did have moral standing, and demonstrate that modern-day AI 
has given no evidence as yet that it has the phenomenal experiences that would give 
it moral standing. The tasks in question are tests of moral and social aptitude. 
Success at these tests would not be certain proof of moral standing, but it would be 
sufficient to base our decisions on, which is the best we can hope for at the moment. 
Finally, I examine the practical consequences of these conclusions for our future 
actions. The use of this particular criterion has significant and interesting results that 
might change things significantly in terms of whether applications of this research 
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Chapter I: On the Grounds of A.I. Moral Standing 
 
1. Introduction 
Artificial Intelligence technology is advancing at an incredible rate. AIs are capable of 
emulating the behaviour of humans to a greater extent than ever before. It might 
soon become tempting to think of them as persons and treat them accordingly. 
However, it is important to have clearly defined and consistent criteria for when 
machines would count as having moral standing and be deserving of this kind of 
treatment.   
 
On February 13th, 2019, the Mars rover Opportunity was officially declared lost after 
numerous attempts to contact it failed.1 This led to an outpouring of emotion on 
social media, with people expressing seemingly genuine grief over the rover’s 
“death”.2 Some people even suggested that a mission should be launched to “rescue” 
opportunity. These people expressed willingness to expend millions of dollars, 
resources that could have gone to help humans suffering and dying on earth, to help 
a robot. However, when thinking about it critically, it is hard to find a good reason to 
think that this robot has any claim to being worthy of such considerations. 
Opportunity had amazingly little processing power and was remarkably simplistic, 
comparing extremely unfavourably to even the cheapest modern home computers 
and phones.3 On reflection, people would realise the irrationality of this desire and 
abandon it, but this points to a problem: that people do not have criteria in mind for 




3 Its only onboard computer has a 1990’s-era 20 MHz CPU and less than half a gigabyte of total 
memory – see Max Bajracharya, Mark W. Maimone, and Daniel Helmick, “Autonomy for Mars rovers: 
past, present, and future”, Computer 41(12) (December 2008), p. 45. 
6 
 
when or why an inorganic machine would be deserving of moral concern. There 
could easily be other cases where the inappropriateness of these feelings might not 
be so easily apparent, and people would not so easily recognise whether they were 
being irrational and make a better decision about the correct course of action. This 
could easily lead to negative consequences. 
 
While it is clear that the relatively primitive Opportunity rover does not in fact have 
any intrinsic moral standing, the development of more sophisticated machines will 
eventually lead to situations where it becomes less obvious that they do not possess 
moral standing. It will become more and more important to have clear criteria for 
when a machine would have the properties that would make moral sentiments 
appropriate, so we can evaluate when actions for their benefit would be justified or 
required. Which criteria we ought to adopt will depend on which moral theory is 
correct. It is obviously unreasonable to require that we prove some moral theory 
correct in advance of solving the questions surrounding AI, since we need practical 
guidance for our actions and to adopt policies that will be accepted by people. It will 
be necessary to make some assumptions for argument’s sake in order to have a 
starting point. First, I will defend an assumption that well-being is what is of 
importance in morality. While this is not completely uncontroversial, it is a claim 
that is common to a wide class of moral theories, thus making conclusions on its 
basis acceptable to a large majority of people and thereby justifying reliance on it. I 
will then justify assumptions about the nature of well-being, and establish which 
properties are necessary to have a level of well-being on that basis. Without firmly 
settling on a very specific theory to the exclusion of others, it is possible to identify 
the capacity for desire as something that figures in a wide range of theories of well-
being, again achieving sufficiently wide applicability. From there, we can move on to 
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examine the degree to which we can have empirical evidence for the existence or 
non-existence of the necessary criteria for well-being when it comes to Artificial 
Intelligences. 
 
2. The Nature of Moral Standing 
In many if not most moral theories, well-being has moral importance, and these are 
the theories I will focus on. The well-being of entities can be morally important for 
many reasons. The well-being of a tree might be important because it supports many 
animals, people might derive pleasure from its presence, and it might be beneficial to 
the environment. In some contexts, people might even speak of the “well-being” of an 
inanimate object such as a building or an artwork, in the sense that such objects can 
be “harmed”, and what happens to them might be morally significant because 
humans derive value from them and it would require an expense of resources to 
repair or replace them. But the “well-being” of buildings and trees, and the “harms” 
that could befall them, is not the same, and does not have the same kind of moral 
importance, as well-being and harm for humans and many other animals. Robots 
and AIs will always have the capacity for “well-being” in the same sense as trees and 
buildings, and it will be morally important not to harm them for the same reasons. 
The question is whether they could have well-being in the same sense as humans, 
and thereby have intrinsic moral importance. 
 
Moral theories that take the well-being of entities like humans to be of importance 
are varied and many. The most obvious example of welfare-based theory would be 
some form of utilitarianism, where we aggregate the welfare of all relevant entities, 
favouring the greatest total welfare, with each counting for one and no more than 
one. But this is far from the only type of moral theory where well-being is important. 
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There are many, many ways that well-being could be morally relevant without the 
goal being to maximize total well-being – we could be obligated to maximize the 
well-being of the least well-off, or to ensure that everyone, or as many people as 
possible, reach some threshold of welfare. These alternative methods of evaluating 
moral outcomes are available to those who wish to avoid some of the potentially 
negative consequences of utilitarianism, such as “utility monster”-style cases4 or the 
so-called “repugnant conclusion”.5  
 
Even in moral theories where well-being is not the only thing of moral importance, it 
is usually seen as one of the things that has moral importance. In addition to purely 
consequentialist theories, well-being is also important in deontological theories, for 
example that of W.D. Ross6 or any other where a duty of beneficence exists. Even in 
the absence of a duty of beneficence, welfare is important when even just a duty not 
to harm exists – any such duty, even if it only applies in certain circumstances, must 
be defined in terms of well-being. There do exist some deontological theories that 
lack any such duty, such as Michael Smith’s explicitly non-welfare-based theory.7 
Smith specifically denies beneficence having any value beyond instrumental value, 
and says that the only real duties involve the rational capacity of entities, not their 
well-being. If one wishes to adopt a deontological theory like this, my arguments will 
not apply. However, such theories are not especially popular, and I do not think I am 
excessively restricting my audience by confining it to people who think that the 
                                   
4 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), p. 41. 
5 A phrase coined by J. M. E. McTaggart in The Nature of Existence (1927) (p. 452-453), though 
examined in detail by and frequently attributed to Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons, 1984). For 
Parfit’s more recent work on approaches that avoid this conclusion, see “Can We Avoid the Repugnant 
Conclusion?”, Theoria 82(2) (2016). 
6 See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (1930). For influential contemporary Rossian ethics see 
Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (2004). 




welfare of at least some entities is morally relevant and therefore ought to figure into 
our moral deliberations. The most plausible deontological theories will require at 
least some attention to the well-being of others. 
 
Virtue theories, in particular Confucian theories,8 also tend to feature some sort of 
benevolence as a virtue, and under these theories it will be especially important that 
judgments be accurate about which entities possess a level of welfare to increase and 
are thus appropriate targets of the exercise of this virtue. There could also be 
perfectionist theories that have a goal of having at least some individuals achieve a 
sufficiently high standard of well-being.9 And though the moral standing of robots 
would not be practically relevant to our actions under it, even ethical egoism is a sort 
of welfare-based moral theory, acknowledging that well-being is important but 
saying one should only be concerned with one’s own. Thus, there are very few moral 
positions that will take no interest in well-being, and as long as some importance is 
placed on well-being my arguments will be relevant. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
reject these preliminary assumptions, and I will not attempt any novel arguments to 
convince those who are committed to a non-welfarist moral theory. Working out the 
criteria under which we would have to consider machines in our moral deliberations 
under these theories would be a worthwhile endeavour, but is beyond the scope of 
this project.  
 
 
                                   
8 See e.g. Alejandra Mancilla, “The Bridge of Benevolence: Hutcheson and Mencius”, Dao 12(1) (2013), 
though for an alternative interpretation see George Rudebusch, “Reconsidering Ren as Virtue and 
Benevolence”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40(3-4) (2013). 
9 The most notable perfectionist writings, like those of Hurka (Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism [1993]) 
and Nagel (Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality [1991]) tend not to put things explicitly in terms of 
welfare, but there is no reason that a perfectionist theory that does could not be adopted. 
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3. The Nature of Well-Being 
There are many different theories of what well-being consists in. I will show that 
there is a criterion for having a level of well-being that is common to the most 
plausible theories of human welfare, namely the capacity to have desires. I will then 
propose a definition of desire that is compatible with other claims made in moral 
theory discourse about welfare, and which should be acceptable to moral theorists 
concerned with well-being (at least more so than the alternatives). This theory is a 
phenomenological conception of desire that posits a certain functional role for the 
phenomenal states. In later chapters, I will provide evidence that this functional role 
cannot be performed with a system that does not possess these phenomenal states. 
 
Let us examine which theories give a role to desire. To begin, I will address a very 
plausible and intuitive measure of welfare: pleasure and pain. It might be thought 
that pleasure and pain alone are the correct dimensions on which to evaluate the 
well-being of sentient beings. However, people are frequently not explicit about what 
they mean by “pleasure” and “pain”, and in fact when we interrogate the ideas 
beyond the naïve folk-psychological concepts, we see that desire is often involved. 
For one thing, it is implausible that there is a particular distinct sensation that is 
common to all experiences we describe as “pleasurable”. Derek Parfit invites us to 
“compare the pleasures of satisfying an intense thirst or lust, listening to music, 
solving an intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and knowing that one's child is 
happy”, and says we will find that “these various experiences do not contain any 
distinctive common quality”.10 There have been recent attempts to salvage the view 
that pleasures are all united by a common “hedonic tone”, but these have not gained 
                                   
10 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1986), p. 493. 
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much traction, and even the authors making these arguments tend to acknowledge 
that this is not a mainstream position.11 One of the ways this theory has been 
amended to account for objections is to say that there might be multiple hedonic 
tones, explaining the diversity of experience as well as people’s different responses to 
each type of pleasure. But this is not what we should focus on in terms of moral 
importance. Not only do the various pleasures Parfit described feel completely 
different, people value them to different degrees, and it seems plausible that they can 
do so even while experiencing the exact same basic sensations. But if people value the 
different sensations to varying degrees, then these sensations are not what is relevant 
to well-being. If two of the experiences have the same amount of two different kinds 
of hedonic tone but one person values one over the other for its own sake, this must 
be explained in terms of something over and above the simple sensation and its 
properties, and it would clearly not be equally good to give that person either one of 
the sensations. 
 
One could also consider the case of the masochist who would claim that he desires 
(under specific circumstances) to experience the sensation of pain, the exact same 
sensation that most people find aversive. Most would agree that it is not bad for the 
masochist to be in pain in this way, but would be bad were a non-masochist to feel 
the identical sensation. It is possible to resist this conclusion by, for instance, saying 
that masochists must be experiencing a different sensation, or insisting that pain is 
still bad for the masochist, but is compensated for by a separate sensation of pleasure 
which is greater.12 But these analyses do not seem empirically plausible, there is little 
                                   
11 See Ivar Labukt, “Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure”, Utilitas 24(2) (June 2012). 
12 For a good overview of several philosophical attempts to account for masochism, see Colin Klein, 
“The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(1) (2014). 
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evidence for them, and they are less parsimonious than the alternative. This is why it 
is preferable to focus on a concept of pleasure and pain such that true pleasures are 
just whatever phenomenal states a person desires to have, while genuine pains are 
those the person desires not to experience. This position sometimes uses the terms 
“happiness” and “suffering” to disambiguate that the simple sensations are not what 
is meant.13 The theory where this is what determines a person’s well-being is termed 
preference hedonism. There might be further restrictions placed on what counts as 
an instance of happiness, but regardless, desiring it is central to what it means for a 
sensation to be good for a person. Thus we see that plausible pleasure-based theories 
of well-being will involve desire prominently. There are of course still responses 
available to those who favour the distinct sensation view, and I cannot definitively 
rule out this position, but I have shown that a view that incorporates something 
beyond simple sensations of pleasure and pain has good reasons to recommend it 
and is the prevalent view in the literature. Thus it is justified to proceed from the 
stipulated position that having the capacity for simple sensations is not sufficient to 
have moral standing merely because such sensations could have “hedonic tone”. 
 
There are many other theories of well-being that define well-being in terms of what a 
person desires without defining it as happiness. These include theories that allow all 
desires, or ones where relevant desires are restricted to self-interested desires, those 
about one’s own life, or those that one would hold given full information, among 
others.14 There are nevertheless some theories of well-being that are not defined in 
terms of what people desire. These include objective list theories like, for example, 
                                   
13 See Jamie Mayerfeld, Suffering and Moral Responsibility (1999). 
14 See, for example, Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (1979). 
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that of Thomas Scanlon.15 However, there are objections to theories like this on the 
grounds that by failing to respect peoples’ desires, they return unpalatable results 
about what is good for a person. As Peter Railton says, “It would be an intolerably 
alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such way 
to engage him.”16 Thus, a possible modification is to require that in addition to being 
on the list, for something to truly be good for a person, it must be desired as well, 
which would be sufficient to show that capacity to have desires is necessary for an 
entity to have a level of well-being that could be affected by our actions. Objective list 
theories as well, when they account for the alienation objection, will have a 
significant role for desire. 
 
Other theories are sometimes phrased as being about having “preferences” or “pro-
attitudes” towards things, rather than using the term “desires”. Despite the use of 
different terms, I think there is little disagreement about the proper class of 
application. Objections to the use of “desire” frequently hinge on alleged conceptual 
problems having to do with an overly-technical definition. But the sense of “desire” 
being used should not be excessively restricted. One type of objection that has been 
levelled is that it is impossible to desire things that you already have (and do not 
need more of), or have desires about the past rather than the future.17 But this is 
clearly not what is meant by people who employ desire as a morally-significant term, 
and this can be solved simply by stipulating that “desire” applies to such cases as 
well. The moral theorists who advocate desire-based theories would presumably be 
receptive to such a modification, since they would likely not wish to insist on 
                                   
15 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998). 
16 Peter Railton, “Facts and Values”, Philosophical Topics 14(2) (1986), p. 9. 
17 See L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (1996), p. 124 and 129. 
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maintaining those distinctions in the face of these type of objections. To do so would 
render their views implausible and arbitrary, and there does not appear to be any 
dialectical reason to prevent them from avoiding those distinctions. This will result 
in “desire” covering a range of other pro-attitudes that have subtle distinctions, such 
as wanting, wishing, hoping, et cetera. Although there are some debates about the 
differences between the various pro-attitudes, the distinction seems to be to a large 
degree semantic, and at any rate the precise differences are not directly relevant 
here. We can continue to use the term “desire” in this less restricted sense, as is 
typical in the moral discourse. Thus theories involving “pro-attitudes” also fall under 
the umbrella of desire-based theories of well-being. 
 
Thus, we have seen that most of the prominent theories of well-being, despite the 
great diversity among them, all have in common that they posit desiring something 
as a crucial component of what makes that thing good or bad for a person. For an 
entity incapable of desiring anything, then, nothing could have any effect on its well-
being, and it would be needless to consider it in our moral deliberations. The capacity 
for having desires is a prerequisite for having a level of well-being like that of a 
person, and is thus a requirement for having moral standing on that basis. 
 
4. The Nature of Desire 
Given that desire is a crucial component of moral standing in these theories, it is 
important to know what exactly “desire” is in order to know whether AIs could have 
moral standing on that basis. However, the majority of moral theorists who employ 
the word “desire” do not give a precise definition of it. It might be that they do not 
think it is important to do so, and intend to plug into their moral theory whichever 
theory of desire turns out to be correct, leaving that up to the philosophers of mind to 
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figure out, and in the meantime will trust that our intuitions about desire will be 
sufficient. Our rough pre-theoretical intuitions about desire might indeed be 
adequate when dealing only with humans, since the various properties we associate 
with desire almost always go together in humans, and we clearly have the capacity for 
all of them. However, in other types of entity, these properties could come apart as a 
matter of course, rather than solely in fringe cases, and the moral consequences will 
change dramatically when substituting in one theory of desire for another. We must 
decide which property or properties are essential components of desiring, and which 
are merely contingently associated with it.  
 
Theories of desire, for present purposes, can be grouped into three main types. One 
group claims that what is essential to desire is something in its phenomenal 
character, an experience of desiring.18 Another claims that desire is very similar to 
belief (in some cases explicitly stating that it is just a type of belief), and thus focuses 
on propositional attitudes and endorsement.19 The last class defines desire in terms 
of behavioural dispositions.20 I will argue we should use phenomenal experience as 
our standard for desire in welfare-based moral theory, as it is the most consistent 
with the way the term “desire” is used in discussions of such theories. 
 
Each of the three main candidate properties has been argued for as the fundamental 
criterion for desire for several different reasons. But the arguments from philosophy 
                                   
18 The theory that most clearly advances this claim is that of Carolyn Morillo (see Carolyn Morillo, 
“The Reward Event and Motivation”, The Journal of Philosophy 87(4) [1990]), and such a theory has 
also been argued for by Galen Strawson (see Galen Strawson, Mental Reality [1994]). 
19 Modern examples include John Broome, “Desire, Belief, and Expectation”, Mind 100(2) (1991) and 
Huw Price, “Defending Desire-as-Belief”, Mind 98(389) (1989). 
20 Michael Smith is the paradigm example of fully endorsing this claim and all of its consequences (see 
Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind 96(381) [1987], “Reason and Desire”, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88(1) [1988], and The Moral Problem [1994]), and it was 
earlier argued for by Elizabeth Anscombe (G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention [1957]). 
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of mind or philosophy of psychology contexts might not be applicable to the use of 
the term for well-being-based moral theory. I will examine each of the theories and 
the arguments made in their favour, but I will primarily focus on the arguments for 
and against each candidate theory that affect their compatibility with the use of the 
term “desire” in the discourse in moral theory. I will not focus excessively on the 
moral verdicts that theories would return and whether these results are intuitively 
plausible, since that will depend heavily on one’s other moral commitments and 
ideologies and will vary significantly from person to person. Rather, I will discuss 
whether the theories in fact return the results that are explicitly claimed in 
arguments where they are used.  
 
Reasons based on desires are frequently given for adopting some moral theory over 
another, and if a theory of desire leads us to exclude something that is used as a 
purported motivation for one of these views, something that is argued to be a morally 
important case of desire (or indeed, if it would compel us to include something that is 
used as an example of a non-significant fact that ought to be excluded), this would 
count as a strike against it as the correct concept of desire. The different sides in the 
debate about which is the correct theory of well-being certainly act as though they are 
using the same concept of desire and having a substantive disagreement about the 
correct application of it, and this should be preserved. For example, one classic 
thought experiment about the correct theory of well-being comes from Derek Parfit; 
it is frequently referred to as the “stranger on a train” case (despite the fact that 
Parfit’s original example makes no mention of a train). 21 In this case, a person meets 
a charming and sympathetic traveller who tells her that he has a terrible disease but 
                                   
21 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), p. 494. 
17 
 
is hoping to be cured of it. The person forms a strong desire that this traveller gets 
better. She never sees nor hears from him again. Parfit says it is implausible to say 
that whether or not the stranger ever actually overcame the disease has any affect 
whatsoever on the person’s well-being, thus challenging the desire-fulfilment theory 
of well-being. 
 
Another famous case relevant to this debate is Robert Nozick’s experience machine.22  
Nozick asks us to imagine a machine that will control all our experiences, leading us 
to feel as though we are experiencing the most pleasurable possible life, all while we 
are in fact remaining motionless attached to the machine. Nozick believes that people 
will have the intuition that the experience machine is not good for us, which he says 
is explained by the fact that it does not fulfil all of our actual desires, only desires for 
particular sensations. Thus Nozick says that the experience machine proves that all 
of our desires play a role in our well-being, and that people’s rejection of the 
experience machine is a reflection of the fact that it is important to our well-being 
not only that we feel as though we are doing the things we want to do, but that we are 
actually doing those things. 
 
When people have different intuitions about cases like Parfit’s stranger on the train 
or Nozick’s experience machine, they tend to argue about whether certain types of 
desires should be counted as morally important, not about what counts as a desire. 
The standard responses to the cases do not include suggesting that those presenting 
them were not imagining an actual desire but had a faulty idea of desire in mind, or 
saying that if they reflected on the concept of desire they would see that their 
                                   
22 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), p. 42–3. 
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description of the situation is impossible. Our theory should avoid, as far as possible, 
making it so that any side in a live philosophical debate is wrong by definition. 
Insofar as the discussion seems to have been proceeding fruitfully, we should attempt 
to accommodate as many as possible of the views and arguments being advanced, 
rather than making it so that the sides are in fact talking past each other. 
Furthermore, if a theory of desire is incompatible with standard claims made in 
moral philosophy in general, and those using desire in proposing a moral theory feel 
no need to address or discuss the fact that their view has significant consequences for 
important debates in the field, that could also be evidence that such a theory is not 
what they had in mind. Thus, the primary focus will be on finding what best 
corresponds to the concept that moral theorists use, not in finding something that 
could be termed “desire” but that would be incompatible with the usage in moral 
theory. 
 
i. The Phenomenological Theory of Desire 
A phenomenological account of desire says that what makes something desired is a 
particular feeling that one has. To desire something means to feel a certain way, 
perhaps when contemplating or entertaining the idea of it, or just in a way such that 
possession of it would change or replace that feeling in a relevant way. This theory of 
desire has intuitive appeal. The common usage of the word “desire” most frequently 
implies a strong feeling, so much so that it would sound somewhat strange to phrase 
it that I “desire” a copy of the morning newspaper, or something equally mundane. 
When the word “desire” is used in non-technical contexts it is frequently preceded by 
feeling-words like “burning” or “fervent”. Of course, I do not mean to restrict “desire” 
to only this poetic sense, it also includes the weaker cases for which we would not use 
“desire” in everyday speech. But the existence and prevalence of that usage says 
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something about the connotations of the term – that the stronger the feelings are, the 
more paradigmatic a case of desire it is. 
 
This theory does not imply that we have infallible access to the content of our desires. 
This is an objection that has been levelled against the phenomenological view by 
Michael Smith, who says that we can be mistaken about our desires in ways that this 
view does not allow for.23 We have infallible access to the contents of our own 
experience, so the argument goes, and cannot be mistaken about whether we are 
having an experience of something even if we can be mistaken about whether our 
experience corresponds accurately to the real world. If a desire just is having an 
experience, there is nothing we could be mistaken about to explain a mistake and 
therefore we cannot be mistaken about our desires. But this happens frequently – 
Smith invites us to “consider cases in which you go to the refrigerator convinced that 
there is something in particular that you want, though you aren't quite sure what it 
is. Then, while looking at the contents you suddenly, as we should put it, 'realise what 
it was that you wanted all along'.”24 However, this is not a serious threat to this 
position for present purposes. People frequently make mistakes about their own 
feelings, and might, for instance, believe they were experiencing crushing ennui 
before realising they were just hungry. Nobody would claim on that basis that hunger 
and ennui are not phenomenological in nature. Furthermore, the difference between 
a desire for an apple and the desire for a pear need not be determined in virtue of any 
feature of the experience that would be introspectable. 
 
                                   
23 Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind 96(381) (1987). 
24 Ibid., p. 46 (footnote). 
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The phenomenological account of desire claims that what is constitutive of desire is a 
phenomenal state that has certain causal features. Some of these causal features are 
the dispositions to change in response to relationships to their object – a desire is for 
an apple in virtue of facts like that the sensation would be responsive to eating an 
apple, or that contemplating an apple affects it in relevant ways, et cetera. A desire-
sensation will also have causal powers in terms of its functional role in terms of its 
effects or potential effects on behaviour. I wish to remain as neutral as possible about 
which exact causal powers desires will have to retain compatibility with as wide a 
range of phenomenological theories of desire as possible. Carolyn Morillo25 has 
advanced a view that posit a phenomenal state playing this role. Dennis Stampe26 
and Graham Oddie27 also have views where a phenomenal experience is constitutive 
of a desire, albeit a specific type of experience: a perception, described as a 
perception of “goodness”. Timothy Schroeder28 has a view that makes a 
representation key to having a desire, specifically a representation that figures into 
reward/reinforcement learning. The concept of a “representation” is notoriously 
complex, ambiguous, and controversial. If these representations are necessarily 
phenomenological in nature, this theory will also fall into the category of 
phenomenological theories of desire (a perception, for instance, is a representation 
that is necessarily phenomenological in nature, though there could be very different 
kinds of sensation that are also inherently representational). All these views differ 
significantly from each other, but in the elements relevant to my project they agree: a 
phenomenal experience is essential to having a desire. 
                                   
25 Carolyn Morillo, “The Reward Event and Motivation”, The Journal of Philosophy 87(4) (1990). 
26 Dennis Stampe, “Defining Desire”, in The Ways of Desire (1986). 
27 Graham Oddie, Value, Reality, and Desire (2005). 





One objection that might be raised to this view is that we are often not experiencing 
any particular desire, and yet it would be incorrect to say that we do not have any 
desires at those moments. A person, it is argued, might have a deep and permanent 
desire that his children succeed in life. And yet, in a moment while he is perhaps 
occupied in concentrating on some task, he is not thinking of his children at all and 
no sensation related to this desire forms any part of his experience. It seems wrong to 
say that he does not desire that his children succeed during that time, but will only 
come to desire that state of affairs again at a later time. Desires are far more stable 
and enduring than the phenomenological theory would seem to imply.  
 
An important thing to say about the phenomenological views is that one need not be 
currently experiencing any sensation to be described as having a particular desire. 
Any plausible theory of desire will allow for standing rather than occurrent desires, 
and the phenomenological theory will accommodate this by claiming that even if a 
desire is not being experienced, or perhaps even has ever been experienced, it might 
still be held if there is a disposition to feel the right sensations if the right things were 
brought to mind. Thus the person in the example, were he distracted from his task in 
an appropriate way by something related to his children, would feel his desire for 
their success, and so he has that desire even while it is the furthest thing from his 
mind. Thus this objection is not a concern for a sophisticated phenomenological 
theory of desire. 
 
It is important for the phenomenological desire theorist to clearly distinguish which 
phenomenal state is at issue. One phenomenal theory of desire that has frequently 
been criticised, and which is in fact unsuitable, is the hedonic theory, which defines 
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desire purely in terms of pleasure and pain. Under this view, to desire something is 
to be disposed to take pleasure when it occurs, and to experience pain and frustration 
when it fails to occur. Obviously this is not a viable option if pleasure and pain are 
defined in terms of desire, as they are in theories such as preference hedonism as 
mentioned previously. If “pleasures” are to be understood as the phenomenal states 
one desires, and “pains” as mental states one wishes to avoid, it would be circular 
and uninformative at best to define “desiring” something as taking pleasure when 
that state of affairs obtains. Furthermore, some moral theorists specifically argue 
that even things that only make you unhappy can be good for you if that’s what you 
desire. Imagine you are involved in a monogamous romantic relationship. You are 
very happy in this relationship. Your partner convincingly professes to be loving and 
faithful, and you have no suspicions to the contrary. If you are not told otherwise, 
you will never find out this is not the case. Many people would report that they would 
nevertheless want to know if they are being deceived in this, and would claim that it 
would therefore be better for them to know the truth, even though it would cause 
them no pleasure, and would in fact be extremely painful, to learn this.  
 
It could certainly be argued that the people who make those claims are mistaken, and 
that it would not in fact be good for them to discover the truth that their relationship 
was a lie. However, when people make that argument, the reason given is not 
generally that the people didn’t truly desire the truth because they would find it 
unpleasant when it actually occurred. Rather, one would claim that those people 
desired the wrong thing, something that was in fact bad for them, since it conflicted 
with their other, more relevant desires. Thus, the hedonic theory is not compatible 
with the discourse on well-being. We should instead say that desiring something does 
not make it in itself a pleasure, but is generally a good guide to what will be a source 
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of pleasure. So, for example, for me to desire a pear does not mean that I take 
pleasure from eating a pear, but rather that if I see a pear, or think of a pear, I feel a 
certain way, experience certain things, that will tend to produce certain behaviours.  
 
We are better served to think of desire-sensations in terms like “wanting” and 
“liking”, pro-attitudes associated with phenomenal states but not identical to 
pleasure. Essentially, this theory posits that we experience or represent things as 
being desired, as good, or as rewarding, as a direct part of our experience, in the 
same way that we experience perceptions or imaginings as being blue. It is a 
standard cause of pleasure, but this is not a necessary connection. This allows desire 
to play the necessary role in our philosophical theorizing, while respecting our folk-
psychological intuitions about it. 
 
ii. The Propositional Theory of Desire 
There are those who advocate the view that the simple pro- propositional attitude, 
the willingness to assent to something’s goodness, is sufficient even without a 
phenomenological component. This has been advanced as the correct view of desire 
by Huw Price, among others.29 Under this view, desires are treated essentially as a 
species of belief, and merely the disposition to state or agree to the relevant 
proposition would be sufficient for someone to be described as having a certain 
desire, even in the absence of any particular feeling (or anything else). This might be 
phrased as having the disposition to assent to the relevant proposition under 
conditions that are idealized in some way (i.e., having other relevant information), to 
                                   
29 See Huw Price, “Defending Desire-as-Belief”, Mind 98(389) (1989). 
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allow for individuals to be mistaken about their own desires, in the same way that 
subconscious beliefs are sometimes posited.  
 
However, this theory encounters significant problems in its application to moral 
philosophy. It can handle, without too much difficulty, the case of someone desiring 
something they do not believe to be good, as seems to happen frequently. At first 
glance, this seems problematic, as it would amount to saying that such a person 
believes something to be good, but doesn’t believe it to be good. But this is acceptable 
if we understand it to be a claim that such a person believes that thing to be good in 
one way, and/or to some extent, and bad in different ways. A person might desire a 
cigarette, believing it to be good in that it will bring pleasure, while still believing it to 
be bad on balance because of its health effects. The problem only arises when we 
examine the reverse case. It seems reasonable to imagine a case where someone 
genuinely believes something to be good, but would claim to fail to desire it at all. 
Imagine someone saying, “I agree that it would be good for me in all sorts of ways to 
learn yoga, I accept that it would have beneficial effects on my mind and body, I have 
sufficient spare time and I might enjoy it, and I have nothing to lose by trying. But it 
does not interest me at all, I have no desire to do it.” We might think such a person 
was irrational, but not conceptually confused. It seems very unsatisfying to reply that 
such a person does not genuinely believe that thing to be good, or that they desire it 
but don’t realize it. I see no reason to assume that such a person is using concepts 
incompetently, and so these seem like entirely ad hoc responses. 
 
In fact, a frequent objection used to motivate the use of desire in theories of well-
being is a type of case where a person believes something to be good but doesn’t 
desire it – for example, someone convinced by a religious cult that it’s good for them 
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to be subject to degrading torture. It is very natural to say that being tortured is not 
good for such a person even though he sincerely believes it to be good because he 
does not desire it, thus providing a counterexample to the claim that all that is 
relevant is whether a person believes a state of affairs is good. This objection would 
be meaningless if we adopt the view that thinking that something is good is 
equivalent to desiring it. And in fact, people do not tend to respond to this objection 
by suggesting that the way to ensure that this torture is actually good for that person 
is to ensure that they really and truly believe it’s good. It appears to be generally 
accepted that such a person could be completely convinced this is good but still not 
desire it, and I’m not aware of anyone who says that it’s still good for that person, or 
would be good for them if they had enough faith. 
 
The propositional theory of desire would also render certain debates in moral 
philosophy completely incoherent. A very significant argument for centuries has 
been the debate between the Humean, desire-based theory of motivation and views 
in the Kantian tradition that claim that rationality and belief can provide motivation 
that can override desires. On Kant’s theory, doing something merely because you 
desire to is less valuable than doing it because you understand it to be right. We must 
(and can) put aside our desires and do what duty demands, according to this view. 
Hume’s view is that reason is always slave to our desires, and we ultimately do 
whatever we desire. This is treated as a substantive empirical claim about human 
psychology, not a tautological definition. Obviously if desire is simply believing 
something to be good, this debate is meaningless. The problem is not that this 
definition of desire decides the matter, but rather that it makes the entire discussion 
complete nonsense, which is certainly not how it has been treated. Surely we do not 
want the result that Kant and Hume and everyone who followed them in this debate 
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had no idea what they were talking about, but should rather say that moral theory 
was clearly working with a different concept. The fact that the moral debate about it 
exists implies that it’s conceptually possible according to the concepts being 
employed. 
 
Finally, it is frequently claimed that at least some non-human animals have desires, 
and have morally-relevant well-being on that basis. But it’s not at all clear whether 
any non-human animals could make judgments about goodness or indeed even have 
any implicit understanding of propositions about goodness. Whether it’s true or not 
that non-human animals deserve moral standing, the people advancing that claim do 
not seem to commit to the view that such animals have conceptual understanding of 
goodness, and do not generally talk as if they do. And those who want to deny full 
moral standing to animals generally do not simply point out the lack of the 
conceptual resources necessary to form such beliefs as evidence of a lack of capacity 
for desires, which would be an obvious response if they understood that to be what 
was being argued. All this is strong evidence that the propositional attitude 
endorsement theory is not what moral theorists have in mind when thinking about 
desires. 
 
iii. The Behavioural Theory of Desire 
Let us now turn to the final prominent class of theory of desire, the behavioural 
disposition theory, which posits that desiring is having dispositions to take certain 
actions in response to certain stimuli. This is sometimes said to be the “standard” 
theory of desire. However, its popularity might be owing to the fact that a significant 
proportion of the aims of psychology and neuroscience, and by extension philosophy 
of mind and philosophy of psychology, involve explaining and predicting human 
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behaviour. Stipulating that desire means whatever causes behavioural dispositions 
might be useful for these purposes, but this does not translate to suitability for moral 
theory, which has completely different goals and concerns. This might be evidence 
that different concepts are at work in the different disciplines. Nevertheless, the 
behavioural theory of desire is the only theory that is explicitly addressed in moral 
philosophy to any significant degree. Michael Smith argues for it, as part of his 
explicitly non-welfarist agent-relative moral theory.30 T. M. Scanlon brings it up 
specifically to say that it has no moral relevance.31 But there is nobody, to my 
knowledge, who advocates a desire-based criteria for well-being or moral standing 
and who explicitly endorses this view of desire. In fact, Michael Smith specifically 
claims that most moral theorists have, at least implicitly, a phenomenological 
concept of desire in mind,32 giving evidence that this is in fact the concept generally 
in use by moral theorists. It is a mistake to assume that prevalence in philosophy of 
mind means that the behavioural theory is “correct” in all contexts, rather than that 
“desire” might be polysemous. 
 
Under the behavioural theory of desire, purely subconscious behavioural “tics” can 
count as desires, even if you are always unaware of them, would deny having them in 
all sincerity, and have no belief (or even actively disbelieve) that any of their effects 
or aims are good. Michael Smith provides an example that shares some of these 
features: a man who is subconsciously disposed to always buy his morning 
newspaper from a newsstand that has mirrors behind the counter, but has no 
awareness that he is doing so and would not be able to identify that he has this 
                                   
30 Michael Smith, “Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values”, Ratio 
24(4) (2011). 
31 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998). 
32 Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind 96(381) (1987). 
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disposition.33 It is natural to say, as Smith does, that this is a case of a subconscious 
desire to look at himself in a mirror, but this is due to other implicit features of the 
case. One naturally imagines that the man has some phenomenological responses to 
this routine, even if he is not aware of the source of these feelings. When 
contemplating going to two different newsstands the thought of the one with the 
mirrors will feel better to him in some way, and actually seeing himself in the mirror 
will presumably make him feel some way that he would not have felt otherwise, thus 
making it natural to think that he desires to go to this particular newsstand and it 
would be wrong to prevent him from doing so. But if we imagine the case with these 
phenomenological features removed, leaving only the features the behavioural theory 
focuses on, one ceases to think of it as a case of desire. It is merely an unconscious 
habit, with no moral relevance.34 
 
Another case that is frequently discussed is Warren Quinn’s “Radioman”, a man who 
is disposed to turn on any radio near him, but does not feel attracted to turning on 
radios, does not derive enjoyment from turning on radios nor from having turned-on 
radios in his presence, does not feel that turning on radios is a good or worthwhile 
thing to do, and suffers no frustration or consternation when prevented from turning 
on radios.35 Quinn uses this to claim that Radioman has no reason to turn on radios, 
which seems correct, but it is also intuitive to say that Radioman does not desire to 
turn on radios.36 This is not a genuine desire to turn on radios, and helping or 
                                   
33 Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation”, Mind 96(381) (1987). 
34 Of course, it is still possible to resist this conclusion (see Michael Smith, “Four Objections to the 
Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies)”, Philosophical Issues 22(1) [2012] for some potential 
strategies), and this is once again a debate that cannot be definitively resolved here. However, most of 
the available responses are only clearly compatible with moral theories vastly different from the ones 
we are considering (such as Smith’s), and as such can be ignored for present purposes. 
35 Warren Quinn, “Putting Rationality in its Place”, in Morality and Action (1993). 
36 See Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, “Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action”, 
Analytic Philosophy 60(1) (2019) for an argument to this effect. 
29 
 
hindering Radioman has no effect on his well-being. Treating cases like Mirrorman 
and Radioman as cases of desire makes sense in the aforementioned philosophy of 
mind context, where the goal is solely to explain and predict behaviour, but these are 
very unlikely to be used as examples of something whose satisfaction or frustration is 
relevant to well-being. This is not what moral theorists have in mind when they say 
desires are important, and excluding them is a virtue rather than a vice for a theory 
of desire in a moral philosophy context. 
 
Furthermore, there are frequent cases where “desires” are posited for things we do 
not and cannot take any action to bring about. One such example is Derek Parfit’s 
previously-mentioned “stranger on a train” argument against unrestricted desire-
fulfilment theories of well-being, where a person meets someone who has an illness 
and develops a desire that this stranger be cured.37 Parfit argues that this is an 
obvious case of a desire whose fulfilment or frustration makes no contribution to the 
well-being of its possessor. But there is nothing the person in question will do, or can 
do, to attempt to bring about this state of affairs, so it seems not to be a “desire” in 
the behavioural-disposition sense. Nonetheless, I don’t think that Parfit would be at 
all receptive to the response on behalf of the simple desire-fulfilment theorist that 
this clearly wasn’t a true desire since it included no disposition to action, and was 
just some kind of “wish”. This has tended to be regarded as just as genuine a case of 
desire as any other. 
 
It might be argued that there would be a disposition to action in that case, just one 
that is never actualized. Presumably the person in question would have acted to help 
                                   
37 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), p. 494. 
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the stranger get cured if there was anything she believed might be effective, there just 
happened to not be any such action available. But we can imagine other cases where 
it is even clearer that no disposition to action is possible – for instance, someone who 
has spent their life being diligently religiously observant, who desires that they were 
correct in their belief that God exist. That seems like something that would be 
accepted as a desire that would be relevant to moral outcomes, since the truth or 
falsity of that fact might indeed drastically change our estimate of how well that 
person’s life has gone. But it is hard to see how it is even conceptually possible for 
there to be any dispositions to actions aimed at bringing that state of affairs about.  
 
Even still, it might be argued that there is a disposition, but one that is impossible to 
actualize. It isn’t clear what the basis would be for positing such a disposition, as 
there doesn’t seem to be any evidence for it. In the absence of any such evidence, it 
would be ad-hoc to do so. But even if a disposition does exist, it seems strange to say 
that it is in virtue of that fact that a desire is had in that case, and that such a 
disposition to (impossible) action, alone, is constitutive of that desire. There might be 
thousands of other such dispositions that a person possesses, completely 
unbeknownst to everyone and impossible to detect. Surely there was some other 
reason we singled that particular thing out as intuitively having moral significance. It 
is obvious that a disposition to impossible action that had no other effects would be 
rejected as being a desire that contributes to well-being. 
 
Another problem the behavioural disposition theory has is that it has difficultly 
accommodating the literature on akrasia. It is frequently claimed that even fully-
informed people do things that go against their ultimate desires and are harmful to 
them. But under the disposition-to-action theory, the fact that you performed an 
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action would show that it was your strongest disposition and therefore your strongest 
desire. The phenomenological view might encounter similar concerns – if you were 
motivated to choose one thing over another, it was probably because you felt more 
strongly about it, and so you desired it more and thus it was better for you. But there 
is an easy response available: one could simply say that usually you feel differently, 
and will feel differently in the future, so it was bad for you. Recall that the 
phenomenological theory is not committed to describing a person’s desires solely in 
terms of their occurrent sensations at a particular moment, but includes dispositions 
to feel certain ways. In this way, the phenomenological theory of desire can avoid 
deciding things one way or the other when it comes to the existence of akrasia. 
Nothing similar seems to be available to the behavioural theory. It would be very 
strange to say that what counts are dispositions to action in situations where no 
decisions about action are being made – indeed, it seems strange to even posit the 
existence of such a thing. 
 
There is also a significant debate about paternalism, and whether it is permissible to 
interfere with people’s actions for their own good. If someone is mistaken about what 
is good for her, some people believe that we ought to give her what is good for her 
regardless, while others think we should respect her wishes. This is not confined to 
unproblematic cases where the person in question is seriously misinformed – for 
example, stopping her from attempting to cross a bridge which she believes is stable 
but is unsafe, or stopping her from drinking what she believes to be tequila until you 
can inform her that it is gasoline. The debate takes place with respect to issues such 
as preventing people from making a decision to ride a motorcycle without a helmet 
or to engage in sex work even when they are fully informed about all the risks and 
consequences. But interfering with fully-informed people’s actions for their own 
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good would be impossible if well-being involved desire-fulfilment and desires were 
just behavioural dispositions. The fact that they were going to perform that action 
would necessarily show that it was their strongest desire, and was therefore what was 
best for them. This is an implausible result. Even if it’s impermissible to interfere 
with peoples’ actions for their own good, it is usually understood to be possible to do 
so, which is why a moral dilemma and a debate about it exists. Of course, one natural 
thing to do would be to combine this theory of desire with a theory of welfare that is 
not based on desire-fulfilment, but such theories are not under consideration here. 
For the purposes of this project, where specific theories have been stipulated, it is 
clear that the behavioural-disposition account of desire is not suitable. 
 
The behavioural theory cannot easily use the standard strategy of second-order 
desires to address these issues, either. Say I want to quit smoking, I think it would be 
better for me and better all things considered, but I can’t resist the impulse to smoke 
cigarettes. It has been frequently claimed that the moral importance of my desire for 
tobacco is changed by the fact that I have a desire not to have that desire. But this 
second-order desire does not seem to be constituted by my having dispositions to 
attempt to change that desire. I might never do anything that actually aims to change 
that desire, and I might not even have the disposition to do anything to change that 
desire. This seems to happen frequently – stop-smoking aids might be readily 
available and offered to me and I refuse them, etc. – but we would still say I have the 
second-order desire, for reasons other than behavioural dispositions. In fact, it could 
equally be said on the dispositional view that I have a second-order desire to 
suppress that desire, since I have a disposition to ignore that desire and avoid 
thinking about actually making any efforts to quit. There is no clear way to establish 




The behavioural disposition theory would also make a mess of the debate between 
Humeanism and Kantianism about motivation. To repeat, it’s generally framed as 
Hume claiming that reason alone never overrides our desires, we always do what we 
desire, while Kant claims that we can and must do what duty demands even if it’s not 
what we desire. If desiring something means having a disposition to bring it about, 
doing anything without desiring it would be impossible, and Kant’s imploration to do 
things we do not desire if they are the right thing to do would be absurd. As for 
Hume, it’s most commonly taken that he is making a substantive claim about human 
psychology, that we in fact always do what we desire, rather than stating the trivial 
tautology that if an action is performed, there must have been a behavioural 
disposition to do it. The behavioural disposition theory, then, does not respect the 
moral theory discourse about desire. 
 
iv.  Summation of the Advantages of the Phenomenological 
Theory 
The phenomenological theory avoids all the major problems with the other theories. 
It can easily accommodate cases both of desiring something without believing it to be 
good and believing something to be good without desiring it. There is no conflict at 
all with something seeming to me to be a certain way but disbelieving it to be that 
way. Much as I can have a phenomenal experience of something as blue but believe 
that it isn’t blue (owing to filters or coloured light or something), I can phenomenally 
experience something as good or rewarding while believing that it actually is bad. 
The opposite is equally true – I can accept the proposition that something is good 
while not feeling or experiencing its goodness. There is a tension in these positions, 




Furthermore, it seems plausible that many non-human animals can experience 
things as good or rewarding without being able to conceptualise things as good or 
rewarding or make judgments about goodness or reward, much as cats and dogs have 
the ability to experience things as blue even if they do not have a concept of 
“blueness” or the ability to judge things to be blue. 
 
The phenomenological view also correctly makes the debate between Kantianism and 
Humeanism an empirical matter. It is certainly conceptually possible to ignore one’s 
feelings and do only what is rationally required. It is equally sensible to claim that in 
all actual cases of motivation, even when someone seemingly performed a selfless 
action, there were in fact desire-feelings at play. Whether Kant or Hume turns out to 
be correct, both positions are consistent and logical.  
 
Akrasia is also possible under the phenomenological view, even if Humeanism is 
right and desires are the only things that can motivate. I might feel a certain desire 
more acutely at a given moment, leading me to act on the basis of it, while other 
conflicting desires I have might be stronger, in the sense that I will feel them even 
more acutely in the right circumstances. It also allows for second-order desires – I 
certainly can feel different ways about my desires when considering them, some 
seeming good to me and others seeming bad. This allows us to accommodate this 
distinction. 
 
Some might be tempted to think that this has shown that more than one criterion 
must exist for a true desire to exist. This is acceptable for my purposes as long as a 
phenomenological component is one of the things required. So, for instance, one 
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might argue that a behavioural disposition along with the relevant feelings is critical, 
or that something must be both felt to be and believed to be good in order to be truly 
desired, or even that all three components must be present. My arguments will still 
apply to such positions. 
 
Therefore, if Artificial Intelligences are to have moral standing on the basis of having 






















Chapter II: The Source of Evidence to Guide Moral Actions 
 
1. The Problem of Other Minds 
We have adopted a class of theories whereby the capacity for some phenomenal state 
of desire is the criterion for moral standing. However, if the relevant criterion for 
having moral standing is phenomenological in nature, it might be questioned 
whether we can ever have truly reliable practical guidance about any of our moral 
actions. We can only have awareness of our own phenomenal states, and can never 
be certain of what other beings are feeling. Even if we can identify correlations with 
our phenomenal states and with reports of the relevant phenomenal states from 
others, we have no direct access to those states, and thus can never have certain 
evidence that these states are present or absent.  
 
This kind of sceptical concern has been discussed for a long time,38 but does not tend 
to trouble people in their practical decision-making when it comes to their dealings 
with other humans (few people struggle with the decision of whether to adopt 
solipsism as the basis for their pragmatic ethical principles, for example). But though 
we are intuitively willing to ascribe consciousness to entities like other humans that 
seem sufficiently like ourselves, it is actually an incredibly difficult question how one 
can know that any entity other than one’s self has phenomenal consciousness. David 
Chalmers’ well-known “Zombie Argument” says that there could be an entity 
indistinguishable from a human but having no mental states.39 Since it is conceivable 
that such a being could exist, we can never be certain of another being having 
                                   
38 At least since John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865). 
39 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996), pp. 93-171. 
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phenomenological experience, so the argument goes. But even if this is logically 
possible, by and large people (quite correctly) do not take this type of sceptical 
argument very seriously when it comes to other humans. There are, however, 
significant differences in the situation when it comes to AI that lead people to 
demand more evidence.  
 
One argument that could be relied on in the human case is that it is reasonable to 
assume that other humans have mental states like one’s own in virtue of them having 
the same material structure.40 Even non-human animals are often similar enough 
that it is reasonable to assume they have most of the same properties. An AI is much 
more different from us than any animal, or at least any animal most people would be 
tempted to say has moral standing. This has led philosophers like John Searle to 
doubt the existence of robot phenomenology.41 Given that this is an important 
practical concern, we cannot withhold judgement until we achieve the kind of logical 
certainty implied by the zombie argument, but need guidance to make decisions. If 
we are dealing with a machine that we believe might have moral standing, our only 
choices are to act as though it has moral standing, or act as though it does not; we 
will have to act in some way. And we may be facing robots that could plausibly have 
some chance to have moral standing sooner rather than later. In fact, without a lower 
bound on how sophisticated of a robot to take seriously as a potential subject of 
                                   
40 This idea goes back a long way as well – see Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and 
Limits (1948), p. 208–9 and 501–4 
41 See John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3) (1980), and 
Daniel Dennett, reply by John Searle, “The Myth of the Computer: An Exchange”, New York Review 
of Books (June 24 1982). However, while Searle’s arguments against the idea that any structure that 
instantiates the right program would be guaranteed to have consciousness seem sound, his claims 
that certain particular non-organic structures could not possess consciousness (such as collections of 
water pipes or beer cans) do not appear to be supported by anything beyond intuition in his writings. 
Searle’s arguments will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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moral concern, it is not even obvious that we do not now have machines that ought 
to be treated as having moral standing. By not adopting any precise or standard of 
what would count as good-enough evidence we would not actually be withholding 
judgement about the standards for saying a machine might have consciousness, but 
implicitly assuming by our actions that all current and near-future AI do not have 
moral standing, but in an unsystematic way without spelling out our justifications. 
We had better make sure that we have an articulable, defensible reason for doing so, 
and more importantly, be ready for advances in AI capabilities to make sure we do 
not change our approach too late or too early. We therefore need a practical standard 
for decision-making that allows for great uncertainty, yet still provides adequate 
guidance. This will allow us to move beyond the excessively restrictive standards of 
engaging with the zombie argument, while establishing what would be the standards 
for a useful test that could establish sufficient evidence for AI moral standing, which 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
2. Moral Epistemology and Decision-Making  
The question is what to do in a situation where we are uncertain of unobservable 
moral properties of the situation, separate from any empirically observable 
consequences. This is somewhat different from how moral arguments usually 
proceed. Standard moral debates take place one of two ways. In the first type, people 
take the moral claims as more or less fixed and evaluate a set of materially different 
outcomes. Which entities have moral standing and which properties have moral 
value are taken as known quantities, and the discussion is about which course of 
action would produce the outcome that better realises those values, in virtue of 
things that are empirically verifiable. Examples of this would be things such as the 
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euthanasia debate, where a common type of consideration is something like whether 
legalising voluntary euthanasia might lead to some people being euthanised who 
were less than fully consenting, an outcome that is agreed to be bad by the 
participants in the debate.42 In this argument, what is at issue is how likely that 
outcome is, how prevalent it would be, and how that balances against some other 
value, like people having greater control and self-determination over their own lives.  
 
In the other main type of ethical debate, cases are presented with their consequences 
stipulated, and our intuitions about their moral value are meant to inform which 
properties we are to put more moral importance on. Implausible scenarios are 
posited to demonstrate that certain ethical principles cannot be held universally and 
are flawed. For instance, in comparing utilitarian and deontological moral theory, 
one might concoct a case where a healthy person could be killed and their organs 
used to save five other people,43 stipulating things like that the doctor’s actions will 
never be discovered, that the transplants are guaranteed to be successful, that the 
person killed would not have gone on to help a greater number of people, and other 
things that could not actually be known for certain in a real-life situation. The point 
is to idealise the situation to determine which principles are more important without 
extraneous or irrelevant factors distracting from it. 
 
The situation when it comes to potentially morally-significant AI is different from 
either of these. We have fixed the properties that have moral value for argument’s 
                                   
42 For an overview of these, see Craig Paterson, “A History of Ideas Concerning the Morality of 
Suicide, Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia”, in Physician Assisted Euthanasia (2009). 




sake – satisfaction and frustration of desires and aversions. The empirical physical 
properties of the outcomes under consideration are also more or less fixed – e.g., a 
machine made of X material programmed to do behaviour Y would have Z state 
inflicted upon it, etc. – so we are not debating unforeseen consequences. However, 
we are uncertain of unobservable properties that would significantly change a 
situation’s moral value, namely the phenomenal states, or lack thereof, in those 
machines. Knowing more about the physical situation cannot by itself answer this 
question, nor can our intuitions about any further moral principles or judgments. 
This is somewhat unexplored territory, but arguments from adjacent areas might be 
adapted. I will examine several different approaches to uncertain moral situations, 
adapt them for the AI situation, and establish their suitability.  
 
One of the few approaches to uncertainty that has been prominently discussed in 
moral theory is the “maximin” approach. In John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,44 Rawls 
arrives at the conclusion that the rational principle to apply in choices where 
outcomes are unknown is maximin, maximization of the minimum, where it is 
ensured that the worst possible outcome is the least bad possible. This might lead 
one to believe that it would be best to treat any entity that could possibly have moral 
standing as though it does, “just to be safe”. However, it would be far from costless to 
take this approach. Treating any entity as having moral standing necessarily imposes 
a burden on others, and if a sufficiently large number of entities are granted moral 
consideration in this way, the burden might be significant. For example, humans 
might do a great deal of unnecessary labour to spare cleaning and maintenance 
robots from having to do unpleasant and burdensome tasks, which would be 
                                   
44 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
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completely wasted if such robots have no moral standing. People might even cause 
some amount injury to humans to avoid severe damage or destruction of robots, 
which would be a very bad decision if the robots had no moral importance. This plays 
into some of the criticisms of maximin that it assumes an extreme risk-aversion 
without any argument for why that risk-aversion is rational.45 In fact, Rawls himself 
says that “maximin is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices under 
uncertainty”46, but only in a case like his Original Position where the choice is 
irrevocable and determines all your future prospects, a situation we do not face when 
it comes to deciding how to treat AI. Furthermore, maximin is described by Rawls as 
the rational and correct principle when outcomes are not just uncertain, but where 
probabilities are completely unknown. This also is not the situation we are in. I am 
not sure what the precise probability is that my iPhone has phenomenal qualia, but I 
am willing to accept that it might be above zero and am quite happy to assert that it is 
less than one-in-a-million. This would make it irrational to include it as a possibility 
in a maximin scenario, since it is such a remote possibility making any significant 
tradeoff to avoid it would be a terrible decision. We must, at the very least, introduce 
a probability floor if we are to adopt any sort of maximin approach. 
 
The standard approach decision-making under uncertainty is a utility calculus. It is 
intended to be used when fairly reliable probabilities and values can be assigned to 
outcomes. A utility calculus is sometimes used in medical ethics – say, for 
determining whether it is appropriate to prescribe a risky experimental drug. If there 
is a 10% chance of causing immediate death, assigned a utility value of negative-50, 
                                   
45 See John Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as the Basis for Morality? A Critique of John 
Rawls’s Theory”, American Political Science Review 69 (1975). 
46 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1980) p. 153 
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and a 40% chance of curing whatever debilitating illness the patient suffers from, 
assigned a value of positve+20, we multiply the outcomes by probabilities and add 
them together and discover that there is a net +3 over the baseline of zero for not 
intervening, and find that it is correct to prescribe the drug. So, for instance, if we 
could somehow know that an AI’s behaviour was only 25% likely to have been 
produced without desire, and we are considering ordering it to do some dangerous, 
difficult, or unpleasant task that has a disutility of -100, it would only be justified if it 
was saving a human from more than 75 units of harm, or over 15 humans from 5 
units of harm each, et cetera.47 The problem with this approach is that it is unlikely 
that we will be able to reliably assign probabilities (or indeed utilities) with that 
degree of precision in the foreseeable future. We can know that no behaviour would 
give absolute certainty that it was produced a mind having the right properties, since 
random chance could always produce a given behaviour. But beyond that it is 
difficult to say any more, since we do not have any data about such situations.  
 
This kind of unreliability of probabilities has been recently discussed in ethical 
decision-theory to some extent. Rowe and Voorhoeve argue that it is normal and 
rational to avoid situations with this kind of uncertainty whenever possible.48 The 
example given is a comparison between a treatment with a known 50/50 chance of 
curing an ailment or doing nothing, and a treatment that will either cure the ailment 
                                   
47 Though it is easiest and most intuitive to use this approach with utilitarian theories, where the 
values represent units of pleasure/happiness vs pain/suffering, other ways of measuring the goodness 
or badness of outcomes could also be quantified this way – for instance, a value of -100 might be 
assigned to failing to respect the rights of a sentient being, and -75 might be assigned to allowing 
people to suffer a certain harm when you could have prevented it at little to no cost. Using this as a 
decision-procedure heuristic would not entail accepting this “ideal utilitarianism” as the objective 
standard of ethical behaviour. 
48 Thomas Rowe & Alex Voorhoeve, “Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 46(3) (2018). 
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or do nothing, but for which the probabilities of each potential outcome are 
completely unknown.49 Most people intuitively prefer the first situation,50 and this 
has been accepted by many (though not universally) to be rational. This also scales 
when we can assign probability ranges – if we can say that a treatment has a chance 
of curing the ailment of between 25% and 75%, this is exactly in between the certain 
50/50 scenario and the completely uncertain scenario in terms of how good it is. 
Rowe and Voorhoeve suggest that it makes sense to be more cautious in these 
situations, and assign more weight to the potential bad outcomes, but claim that how 
much weight to assign to assign to each outcome is to some extent “up to you”, and 
that tensions exist between several principles of rationality in these situations.51 The 
medical treatment example as written seems to be more applicable to cases of AI 
research – it weighs against putting ourselves in a situation where we are dealing 
with an AI where we have a high degree of unreliability in assigning probabilities to it 
having moral standing. To make it clear how it would apply to decision-making when 
we already have that kind of unreliability, consider the following case: if we provide 
the only treatment available, there is a chance between 0% and 25% that it will make 
the patient’s condition worse by some negative value (or within a range of negative 
values), and a chance between 25% and 75% that it will cure the condition, giving a 
positive increase to utility (if neither of these obtain it will do nothing). There are 
several different ways one could aggregate the different uncertain variables to come 
to an expected utility value, either adopting the suggested pessimistic risk-aversion 
                                   
49 p. 247 
50 See Stefan Trautmann and Gijs van de Kuilen, “Ambiguity Attitudes,” in The Wiley 
Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, ed. Gideon Keren and George Wu 
(Chichester: Wiley, 2015), pp. 89–116 
51 p. 250 
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or not,52 and determine whether the action of administering the treatment has higher 
expected value over not intervening. Thus when it comes to AI, a test that gives a 
reasonable probability ceiling would be enough for action-guidance. 
 
However, it is far from uncontroversial that risk-aversion is rational in all situations. 
It might depend heavily on what outcomes are at stake. An established approach that 
realises the value of caution in certain situations without unduly affecting things in 
other situations is what is known as the “precautionary principle”, which essentially 
says that we only should choose a course of action (when one is available) where the 
worst possible outcome is not an unacceptable disaster. If the worst possible 
outcome is not fully disastrous, the precautionary principle does not apply, but if 
there is any chance of something sufficiently bad happening, we should act to avoid 
that outcome even if the probability of it is low or unknown. This is an improvement 
over extremely risk-averse principles like maximin and arguably over more 
moderately but universally risk-averse principles like those of Rowe and Voorhoeve, 
since it allows for a rule where we would not be barred from everyday things like 
inconveniencing our mobile phones or our robot vacuums, but only from things that 
would cause more extreme potential harms like destroying large numbers of AIs that 
potentially have moral standing.  
 
The problem with this form of the precautionary principle is what to do about 
incredibly unlikely scenarios with very bad outcomes. We would have to avoid 
                                   
52 See Kenneth Arrow and Leonard Hurwicz, “An Optimality Criterion for Decision Making under 
Ignorance,” in Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics (1972) for one example of a principle that 
is amenable to this. 
45 
 
certain courses of action even if the chances of them occurring were a billion to one 
against, where under even a very risk-averse version of the decision-theory model 
multiplying by such a low probability could render this possibility irrelevant. 
However, that paradigm is not immune to this type of concern either – imagine that 
the extremely unlikely worst-case scenario involves accidentally creating a race of 
sentient self-replicating AIs that would produce endless generations of AI that exist 
in constant suffering, thus producing a near-infinite amount of disutility. Even 
multiplying this by an extremely low probability could still produce an unacceptably 
high number, allowing an extremely unlikely scenario to unduly influence our 
decisions. For this reason, proponents of the precautionary principle have made 
allowances for excluding things that fall in a sufficiently low range of probability, like 
the aforementioned mobile phone case, in accordance with the principle of de 
minimis.53 For a risk to be de minimis means that the chance of it occurring is so 
small that it can be disregarded, and that actions carrying only a de minimis risk are 
“virtually safe”. However, there is still a difficulty for our purposes, since determining 
which things do and do not fall under the category of de minimis will require us to be 
able to assign probabilities, which (as I have argued) we will not always be able to do. 
There are clear cases, like the probability that a mobile phone has any phenomenal 
qualia, where even though we cannot assign a precise probability we can be sure that 
the chance falls below the reasonable threshold. However, in other cases it will not be 
so obvious whether the possibilities are small enough to ignore. J. Adam Carter and 
Martin Peterson have argued that we would need to take into account a “second-
order” probability, the probability that our first probability is mistaken.54 As an 
                                   
53 See Martin Peterson, “What is a de minimis risk?” Risk Management 4 (2002). 
54 J. Adam Carter and Martin Peterson, “On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle”, 
Erkenntnis 80(1) (2015), pp. 1-13. 
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example, “if the probability is .01 that the probability is one in a billion that 
substance XYZ will cause cancer, it would be ridiculous to claim that XYZ is de 
minimis”, because “the actual first-order probability could be much higher.”55 
However, they raise the concern that it is difficult to determine how these 
probabilities interact in a way that is not ad-hoc. If we multiply the probabilities of 
danger, we get a lower probability this way than considering only the first-order 
probability, which is obviously wrong. If we invert the probability, and calculate the 
probability that a course of action is safe, “we get the result we want, but we seem to 
have no good epistemic reason that explains why this way of carrying out the 
calculation is correct and the other way incorrect”, according to Carter and 
Peterson.56 However, it is not as though the other approach, of calculating 
probability of danger, is natural or default and this is an impermissible ad-hoc 
amendment. We need to choose one or the other if we are to have pragmatic action-
guidance, and even if there is no reason to prefer one over the other apart from 
giving us the results that seem intuitive, that is sufficient to prefer calculating the 
probability of safety. At any rate, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen claims that there are 
perfectly good principled reasons to choose this way of doing it over the 
alternatives.57,58 Nonetheless, even if there is some question about how principled 
this approach is, it is better than having no system whatsoever. There does remain a 
concern about how confident we can be in that second-order probability assessment, 
but if it is at least somewhat reliable, it will suffice for practical purposes. 
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58 Carter and Peterson remained unconvinced by these arguments (see J. Adam Carter and Martin 
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Thus we see what we need out of a test of AI – to make sure that we can establish that 
what would be sufficiently bad outcomes are sufficiently unlikely, by establishing an 
upper bound for a probability range. Therefore, what we need is a minimum 
standard of exclusion, a test such that, if it is not passed, it is acceptable to ignore 
that entity in our moral considerations, while allowing in as few things as possible. It 
is conceivable that modern computers have the properties required for moral 
standing, but it is unlikely enough that it is acceptable, and indeed preferable 
(sometimes even morally required), to treat them as if they do not. Thus, tests that 
modern computers can already pass are not suitable. Tests that are too demanding 
will similarly be unsuitable, leaving too great a chance that we could be doing 
something morally unacceptable. 
 
3. Criteria For an Adequate Test of AI 
We must find a sort of fast, practical, easy-to-conduct test would allow us to have 
evidence that capacities relevant for moral standing are present. The standard test of 
AI that immediately comes to mind, the Turing Test, is entirely inadequate for these 
purposes. The Turing Test, originally developed by Alan Turing, involves having a 
text-based conversation with an AI and seeing whether it can be reliably 
distinguished from an actual human by a judge that is blind to all features of their 
interlocutors apart from the contents of the text messages produced.59 This test is at 
once too demanding and too easy. It is too demanding, because it is entirely possible 
to have the properties necessary for moral standing without being able to pass. Many 
entities that clearly have moral standing, such as very young children and people 
                                   
59 See Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 59(236) (1950). 
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with disorders such as severe aphasia or schizophrenia, will frequently or always fail 
the Turing Test owing to lack of sufficient linguistic competence. This is also the case 
for non-human animals – none of them possess any significant degree of linguistic 
ability, but most people would accept that at least some animals have some degree of 
moral standing, including of (at least of some of) elephants, dolphins, rats, cats, dogs, 
pigs, chimpanzees, etc. 
 
The ability to pass the Turing Test cannot even be a sufficient condition, since many 
simplistic chatbots, which clearly do not have the relevant properties, have been 
reported as having passed. As early as 1966, the program ELIZA was convincing 
people that it was a real person, despite being incredibly simplistic. The ELIZA 
program purported to be a Rogerian psychotherapist, and convinced people by 
relying on broad stereotypes of Rogerian psychotherapy, essentially sticking to 
variants of “why do you think that is?”, “how does that make you feel?”, and “tell me 
about your mother”.60 The expectations about Rogerian psychotherapy provide an 
explanation for what would otherwise be a violation of conversational norms. Other 
chatbots have passed in a similar way – the Eugene Goostman program was 
proclaimed as the first program to have passed the Turing Test due to having 
convinced people that it was a 13-year-old child who did not speak English as a first 
language. Once again, it achieved this through simplistic tricks that are not indicative 
of any of the capacities that would confer moral standing.61 The linguistic ability that 
                                   
60 Huma Shah, Kevin Warwick, Jordi Vallverdú, and Defeng Wu, "Can machines talk? Comparison of 
Eliza with modern dialogue systems" (2016). 
61 Celeste Biever, "No Skynet: Turing test 'success' isn't all it seems", The New Scientist (9 June 2014). 
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would allow an entity to pass the original Turing Test has no real correlation with 
moral standing. 
 
It might be argued that the reason relatively unsophisticated programs have passed 
the Turing Test is that the tests have not been conducted sufficiently rigorously. 
Many of the tests had a restricted domain of discussion, and generally were 
conducted over a period of as little as five minutes.62 It is certainly reasonable to 
insist that the spirit of the Turing Test would allow it to last much longer than that 
brief, arbitrary limit, and allow discussion of any topic.63 However, it is not clear how 
much this change would help. The test cannot be allowed to go on indefinitely, not 
only for practicality reasons, but also because even humans cannot perform 
competently in a Turing Test forever. How long until a human becomes too bored, 
tired, or impatient to continue to produce novel sentences? Not limiting the field of 
discourse is certainly an improvement, but if the replacement is simply selecting 
fields of discussion at random, there is no guarantee that anything more difficult for 
these programs will come up. People are generally pretty bad at intuitively predicting 
which tasks computers will have a problem with, and as such we cannot rely on 
simply allowing free choice of topics. Rather, if there is some reason particular topics 
will be more likely to require morally-relevant capacities to discuss competently, we 
should figure out which those are and why, and focus on testing those specifically. 
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minutes of questioning.” (Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 59[236] 
[1950], p. 442). However, he later said that a real pass of a test “with no questions barred” would take 
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Some additional restrictions on the Turing Test have been proposed to deal with 
these concerns. One example is the so-called “Lovelace Test”,64 which requires not 
only success in the test, but also that the success cannot be explained by what was 
put into the program. In effect, the machine cannot have been deliberately and 
purposefully designed to accomplish a task, but has to be able to do something where 
the programmer cannot explain exactly how this was achieved. This might be 
thought to have been achieved to some degree by the “black box” nature of machine 
learning procedures, where the processes are somewhat opaque and cannot easily be 
examined.65 This criterion bears some similarity to Daniel Dennett’s “intentional 
stance”,66 wherein we are required to treat entities as having certain mental states 
when that is the only way we have to explain and predict their behaviour, but if we 
have a full mechanical explanation of a certain behaviour, the intentional stance can 
be discarded to allow for greater precision and accuracy. In fact, the intentional 
stance theory has been expanded by other thinkers to include phenomenal states, 
making for a “phenomenal stance”.67 A theory like this would certainly exclude the 
present-day chatbots, as they are not terribly complex and it is fairly easy to 
understand and explain how they achieve the success they have from a structural 
perspective. However, this amended sort of test is no good for our purposes either. 
Part of the appeal of Turing Test-style measures is not requiring that we look at the 
underlying structure of subjects, but allowing reliance on easily observed external 
behaviours. The same behaviour should always consistently constitute either a “pass” 
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or a “fail”, regardless of the entity performing it. Even more importantly, however, 
this requirement would risk us either applying an arbitrary double standard, or 
getting completely unacceptable moral results. Our understanding of the workings of 
the human brain continues to advance constantly, and it is not implausible to think 
that we will someday have a complete explanation of all or most human behaviour in 
causal-mechanical terms. But the mere existence of such a possible explanation 
would not mean that the explanation involving phenomenal states was illicit or 
incorrect, and to accept that would be to say that at that point we could not say that 
humans have moral standing on that basis. Rather, we need a test where the only 
reasonable explanation for passing is similar enough to the explanation for how 
humans pass, where the explanation in the human case is related to the relevant 
desire-phenomenology. 
 
Could there be a better form of the Turing Test, where the behaviour it tests for 
would by itself be adequate evidence of moral standing? There are a number of 
variations on the Turing Test that have been proposed that intuitively seem plausible 
as a measure of moral relevance, but they generally come with no principled 
explanation of why accepting them as such is justified. If some of these do in fact 
track the capacity for phenomenal desire, then my arguments will have given them a 
supporting explanation, and the existence and advocacy of these tests as an intuitive 
measure will provide further evidence that the properties I have identified are the 





4. Answering Some Doubts for Turing-Style Behavioural Tests 
There remains a question of whether any test of external behaviour can ever truly 
give any evidence of the possession of internal states. As previously mentioned, the 
zombie argument is not a persuasive challenge to this. For one thing, concerns have 
been raised about Chalmers’ argument, such as over whether zombies are in fact 
properly conceivable, and over whether conceivability actually entails possibility.68 
Even if I can, in some sense, entertain the proposition that a philosophical zombie 
exists, it might still be metaphysically impossible, much as I can entertain the 
proposition “what if water were not H2O”, even though that is still an impossibility. 
However, even if Chalmers’ argument is right, it is at best a mere logical possibility. 
There is no evidence for it being in any way likely in the actual world. Furthermore, 
acting on the basis of that possibility, even if it were likely enough to justify doing so, 
would require us to doubt the phenomenological capacities of other humans just as 
much as any other entity, and so would ultimately change nothing. Solipsism is no 
serious alternative to any other reasonable plan of practical action-guidance. As there 
is no evidence whatsoever for its actual likelihood, and treating it as a possibility 
would provide no practical guidance, the possibility of zombies is irrelevant to my 
argument. 
 
Far more problematic is the case where an entity is not empirically indistinguishable 
from humans, but instead is observed to have a vastly different neural structure to 
humans. Such an entity could in theory behave in all the same ways as humans such 
that it cannot be differentiated from a normal human without looking at that neural 
                                   




structure, and yet have no mental states. Ned Block has presented such an argument, 
a hypothetical program modelling his Aunt Bertha.69 The “Aunt Bertha” program has 
a massive table of appropriate responses to any English sentence, and when given a 
sentence as an input, it gives an appropriate response exactly as Ned Block’s Aunt 
Bertha would give. If we take it that this entity has no phenomenal states, we have a 
problem. The existence of such a program is a logical possibility as well, and more 
likely to be possible than Chalmers’ original zombie case, and this is a case that might 
make a relevant difference to how we ought to act, since it differentiates AI from 
humans by introducing an uncertainty that applies only to the former. Taking it 
seriously does not throw all of our decision processes into doubt like accepting 
solipsism would, it would simply introduce uncertainty in this specific area.  
 
The reason Block’s case is a concern is that the structure he describes seems 
intuitively like it could not possess phenomenal consciousness or any other morally 
significant mental states. It is a structure similar to programs that can be run on our 
personal computers and smartphones. It undermines the notion that we can 
distinguish which entities have moral importance based on their behaviour, and 
removes any means we have of knowing where to draw the line between which 
structures are complex enough, or similar enough to human brains, to have the 
relevant mental properties. To alleviate this concern, it will be sufficient to establish 
that not just any old structure will be sufficient to produce the kind of behaviour 
associated with the mental states we are concerned with. As long as these kinds of 
behaviours can not be produced by the kind of structures where it is excessively 
implausible that could produce phenomenal consciousness, like Block’s Aunt Bertha 
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table lookup program, we will have sufficient certainty for action-guidance. We will 
still not know with absolute certainty whether any given artificial intelligence has any 
given phenomenological state, but we will have a principle that is adequate for 
practical purposes. I will present several arguments that imply that in fact any 
structure that is likely to produce behaviour associated with the relevant phenomenal 
states will not be so simplistic as to obviously lack phenomenal consciousness. 
 
It has been claimed that observed cases of multiple realisability of cognitive states 
undermines the idea that there is any distinctive structure that correlates with 
whatever mental states we think are relevant. This is only a serious problem if there 
are actual observed cases of multiple realisability to give support to this, since if it is 
a mere possibility it ought to play no role in our practical deliberations, much like the 
mere possibility of zombies or the massive table-lookup program. It has been alleged 
that there are such cases of multiple realisability, both within and across species, but 
William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale have argued that widespread multiple 
realisability is not nearly as plausible as has been popularly assumed.70 If general 
multiple realisability were true, they argue, it would lead to global scepticism about 
everything neuroscience tells us. But the successes of neuroscience tell us that is 
unlikely to be the case. According to them, “in PET especially, but also in MRI, the 
signal to noise ratio is relatively low, requiring averaging across subjects. Averaging 
will cancel out individual differences; thus, the fact that any results at all survive 
averaging as well as transformation onto a common brain plan indicates a great deal 
of commonality”,71 which dismisses many of the claims about intra-species multiple 
                                   
70 William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, “Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and 
Neural States”, Philosophy of Science 66(2) (June 1999). 
71 Ibid., p. 190 
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realisability. They also explain that “most neuroimaging to date is performed on 
humans while the most detailed neuroanatomical and neurophysiological work 
(using, e.g., single-cell recording) has been done on other species. As a result, 
researchers often have to try to coordinate the imaging work on humans with 
neuroanatomy from other primate species (especially the macaque), and thus are 
assuming that cognitive functions are not differently realized in the two species.”72 
Commonalities have also been observed in species more distant from humans, such 
as dogs and rats. The success of this type of approach in neuroscience have given us 
reason to doubt multiple realisability across species. Though there are some 
differences between different species in brain structures, there are far more 
similarities when the same states are observed, and this would be unlikely unless 
there were significant constraints on which structures can realise the right sort of 
property. If this is true, it is very unlikely that we will find entities with massively 
different neural structures that will be able to perform the same kind of tasks.  
 
Stuart Shieber has demonstrated that a program of the kind Ned Block describes is in 
fact a nomological impossibility.73 It is logically possible for a table to include all 
likely inputs and all reasonable responses, but “adding the further constraint of mere 
physical existence in the current universe is sufficient to provide a strict limit on the 
storage capacity of the machine and hence how long a Turing Test it could pass”,74 a 
figure which, giving the most generous possible inputs, Shieber calculates to be about 
37 seconds. In other words, the entire storage capacity of the universe could only 
                                   
72 Ibid., p. 190 
73 Stuart M. Shieber, “There Can Be No Turing-Test Passing Memorizing Machines”, Philosopher’s 
Imprint vol. 14 no. 16 (June 2014). 
74 Ibid., p. 7. 
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store enough conversation strings to be sure of communicating appropriately 
through 37 seconds of conversation. Thus a program exactly like what Block 
describes is of no real concern for practical decision-making. 
 
It is of course possible to optimise the program with programming tricks and 
shortcuts in such a way as to significantly improve its performance and extend the 
amount of time it can emulate human behaviour – as proved by the fact that 
programs of a similar kind have succeeded in passing the Turing Test for several 
minutes. It might be thought that we can simply optimise such programs further 
until they can pass for much longer, and they will still essentially be simple table-
lookup programs with no claim to having phenomenal states. We will then again be 
in a situation where we have no evidence of which entities have the right mental 
states based on their behaviour. However, Drew McDermott75 has argued that 
cognitive science implies that the structure of any program adequate to the task of 
emulating human behaviour indefinitely is likely to just be an optimized model of the 
human brain, and that it would therefore be illogical to deny that it has the same 
mental states as a human brain. The table-lookup-style program would need to have 
so many complex rules and shortcuts to fit in a reasonable storage space that its 
structure would necessarily become fairly complex. If someone were to somehow 
make such a program, and we examined the structure in detail, it is quite likely that 
we would find that the structure would be equivalent to an optimised model of the 
brain. In fact, a large degree of optimisation might not be possible, and the basic 
structure we produce might simply be pretty much that of (at least some part of) the 
                                   
75 Drew McDermott, “On the Claim that a Table-Lookup Program Could Pass the Turing Test”, Minds 
and Machines 24(2) (2014). 
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human brain, which would make it very plausible that it has the same mental states 
and properties as a human brain. As McDermott says, “a seemingly unintelligent 
program might turn out to be an optimized version of an intelligent program, with 
the same intelligence”.76 To insist otherwise would essentially require us to dismiss 
all of cognitive science. If we “suppose it is impossible to model the human brain 
computationally, in the sense that no matter how fine-grained one’s model of the 
brain’s neurons, synapses, vesicles, glands, glial cells, etc., something crucial is 
always left out […] then it’s difficult to see how scientific psychology is even 
possible.”77 However, McDermott explicitly exempts phenomenological properties 
from this argument, to leave the possibility of some kind of dualism as an option.78 It 
is not clear, however, why it is wrong to deny “intelligence” to the optimized brain if 
it is acceptable to deny it “experience”. If matching the computational and functional 
profile of the brain can still leave ingredients out, why couldn’t intelligence be one? 
Rather, it’s more plausible that all the ingredients are necessary to match the 
functional profile. At any rate, there is no evidence to deny that all the properties of 
the brain must emerge from a perfect match of its structural and computational 
profile, and as such we would be required to treat such a reproduction as equal to a 
human. 
 
If we follow arguments about structural constraints further, we get to the extreme 
physicalist position of John Searle.79 Searle argued that the exact material makeup of 
the brain (and perhaps parts or all of the body) might be necessary to get the right 
                                   
76 Ibid., p. 144. 
77 Ibid., p. 162. 
78 Ibid., p. 163. 
79 John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), pp. 417-457. 
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mental states, and even an exact duplicate of the structure would not be enough to 
guarantee the same mental states if it were composed of a different material. It is 
very implausible to claim that a match this direct would be necessary to achieve the 
correct functions and behaviours, so if the criteria is this precise, function and 
behaviour will again not be a reliable guide. Searle has an argument with similarities 
to the zombie argument and the Aunt Bertha argument, the “Chinese Room” 
argument. In this case, it seems as though a computer is able to converse perfectly in 
written Chinese to an interlocutor, but in fact the “computer” is just a monolingual 
English speaker in a room that contains books of Chinese symbols with instructions 
on which to output in response to inputs. Searle argues that no matter how 
convincing the responses seem, neither the room, nor the person, nor the system of 
the room and the person, understands Chinese. Searle also insists that a structure 
matching the human brain would not be sufficient to overcome this objection: 
 To see this, imagine that instead of a mono-lingual man in a room shuffling 
symbols we have the man operate an elaborate set of water pipes with valves 
connecting them. When the man receives the Chinese symbols, he looks up in 
the program, written in English, which valves he has to turn on and off. Each 
water connection corresponds to a synapse in the Chinese brain, and the 
whole system is rigged up so that after doing all the right firings, that is after 
turning on all the right faucets, the Chinese answers pop out at the output end 
of the series of pipes.80 
This system still, according to Searle, could not have any understanding. If this were 
true, there would be no point in discussing the potential moral standing of AI, since 
such a thing would be impossible. A different substance would never produce the 
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same states, Searle says, any more than one could run a computer model of lactation 
and still get real milk. Nothing short of building an actual organic brain would ever 
be sufficient. However, I do not believe we should take our intuitions about such a 
case as reliable, since it is so far removed from our experience and from reality. A 
water pipe system of the type Searle describes, in order to actually match the 
structure of the brain’s neurons and synapses, would probably need to be about the 
size of a planet, given the minimum sizes based on the properties of water and pipes 
compared to the substances of the brain. At that scale, information would have to 
travel much faster than water can to achieve the same speed of response – and 
obviously much faster than the electrical impulses in the actual brain travel, since the 
distances involved are much greater. This would basically necessitate the water 
travelling faster than the speed of light and violating several immutable laws of 
physics. It is not clear we can imagine such a thing coherently, and certainly unlikely 
that we are imagining it accurately, so there is little reason to trust our intuitions 
based on this imagining. Searle also claims that “in principle the man can internalize 
the formal structure of the water pipes and do all the "neuron firings" in his 
imagination.”81 However, it is obviously beyond the cognitive and information-
storage capacity of the human brain to do this, as no system can run a simulation of 
itself. This is at best a mere logical possiblity, possible “in principle” but not in 
practice, and indeed might not even be possible in principle. It should play no part in 
our deliberations. There is no real evidence of the correctness of Searle’s strict 
criteria, and if we were faced with an entity that had a brain with a structure exactly 
like that of a human but made of silicon and metal rather than carbon and organic 
acids, and that acted exactly like a human, it would be excessively morally risky to 




not treat it as having moral standing merely on the basis of the claim that it might 
need to be made of organic materials to have the capacity for phenomenal 
consciousness. 
 
A further positive argument that the right behavioural tests will provide true 
evidence for the existence of phenomenal qualia comes from Karl Popper and John 
Eccles,82 who have argued that qualia of the kind associated with pain and desires 
must be essential for our behaviour and continued success, since otherwise they 
would not have evolved or would have since been discarded as evolutionarily non-
advantageous. They present experimental evidence that consciousness does have 
advantageous functional roles, and conclude that “the self-conscious mind exercises 
a superior interpretive and controlling role upon the neural events” that is not 
replaceable.83 One might make an objection against this argument, that the qualia 
might just be necessarily caused by the same thing that causes the behaviour, rather 
than being the cause of this behaviour. However, this is a very minor distinction and 
is irrelevant for my purposes. The behaviour would remain just as reliable a guide to 
the existence of the qualia. In this type of epiphenomenalism there is still no 
contingency to their relative place in the causal chain, it is just that it is a branch 
rather than a link. Evolution would have found a more efficient system, if one 
existed. If this is true, it is unlikely that we will find entities with the same 
capabilities that lack the relevant qualia. 
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David Lewis discusses the case of “mad pain” as a challenge to strict functionalism – 
a person might feel the same sensation that humans usually feel in cases of pain, but 
it might cause completely different behaviour, not leading to any attempt to stop or 
avoid it, and it might also be caused by completely different things.84 This seems 
possible, though we would have no way of knowing if that were occurring in reality 
based solely on observation of behaviour. Conversely, Lewis proposes the case of 
“Martian Pain”, which is a state that serves the exact same causal role as pain, but is 
instantiated by a completely different physical structure in the Martian race – it 
involves the hydraulic inflation of chambers in their feet.85 Lewis states that both 
elements have claim to being what determines phenomenal content. This would 
make it impossible to just rely on looking at neural structure either. According to 
Lewis, however, if a state is phenomenological in nature (like pain, and as I have 
argued, like desire), the phenomenal character of such a state is inextricably linked to 
the properties that make it such a state, and it is impossible to consider the latter 
without the former. “Only if you believe on independent grounds that considerations 
of causal role and physical realization have no bearing on whether a state is pain 
should you say that they have no bearing on how that state feels”.86 The Martian pain 
state, in virtue of playing the same causal role for their species as human pain, must 
feel painful. The mad pain state, in virtue of having the same physical realisation as 
typical pain in humans (just with different causal connections), surely feels painful as 
well. This also provides an answer for potential problems with neurologically atypical 
humans – a human would feel desire in virtue of having similar, though slightly 
defective, brain structures as normal humans, such that they do not fulfill the causal 
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role correctly, bearing some similarity to mad pain, being a sort of “mad desire”. Its 
causal history and structure is just as normal until something goes wrong at the 
behavioural output phase. On the other hand, an AI that has a very different 
structure from humans but that reliably produces the correct behaviour associated 
with desire could be considered as likely to have actual desire, just a sort of “martian 
desire”, similar to how the martian has exactly the right causal connections 
instantiated by a different structure. Whereas if a non-humanlike structure produced 
behaviour similar to, say, a psychopath (this example will be explored in detail in 
later chapters), it is likely to have no desire and therefore no moral standing, which 
we can say without claiming that humans with such conditions have no moral 
standing. 
 
In this way, we could have a very reliable empirical way of determining whether 
Artificial Intelligences feel pain or desire or other such states – if their behaviour can 
robustly match the causal connections that exist in entities that we are pretty sure 
have the correct phenomenal states (and that is, very robustly),87 then we know that 
this particular AI architecture produces pain in this population, even if individual 
members are programmed to react abnormally to it. This avoids relying solely on 
individual functionality, since it might be possible to program some sort of override 
such that every part of the process involves phenomenal states in normal ways until 
at the very moment of action, the action is replaced by one consistent with the 
opposite phenomenal state or with no phenomenal state. 
                                   
87 We must avoid unsophisticated cases of emulating the causal profile, since behaviours such as 
reacting and complaining when treated roughly can be (and have already been) added to things as 




However, there remains a concern for someone who believes they do have precisely 
the kind of independent grounds for disregarding considerations of causal role and 
physical realization that Lewis refers to. It is possible to (at least believe oneself to) 
have such grounds in the case of pain, and is perhaps even more likely in the case of 
phenomenological desire. The argument would proceed more or less as follows: the 
causal roles are too loosely-defined, and the physical realisations too disjunctive and 
dissimilar (both within and across species), for there to be a sufficiently well-defined 
concept to make such claims, and the state in question (pain, desire, whatever) is 
either just the sensation (or a disjunction of sensations), or a fiction. The concern is 
the possibility of an entity that has the relevant qualia, but that play a different causal 
role, not due to a deviation from a baseline of normality but as a matter of course. 
Lewis claims that this is conceptually impossible,88 but his claim might not be 
entirely satisfying. But for my purposes, I need not establish that it is conceptually 
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Chapter III: The Dopaminergic System, VTA/SNpC, and Reward 
 
1. On the Individuation of Phenomenal States 
We have seen that the morally-important concept of desire is best understood as 
involving phenomenal states. I have established that we need a practical, behavioural 
test that will give us a reasonable estimate of the probability that an entity possesses 
the capacity for desire phenomenology. What I will now turn to is determining which 
brain states in humans correspond to the phenomenal states associated with desire 
that moral theorists care about, and determine which functional roles they play. As 
has been alluded to earlier, the use of the term “desire” in the cognitive science 
literature will provide little guidance, since this term is generally defined in a purely 
behavioural-dispositional way in that field. It is unlikely that all and only things 
referred to as “desires” in cognitive science will be the kind of desires of interest for 
present purposes. I will therefore analyse and interpret the terms used by moral 
theorists to see which plausibly count as cases of desire phenomenology.  
 
How can we determine when a relevant desire is present? There are two prima facie 
intuitively plausible answers to this question that are not in fact viable. The first is to 
demand a direct neural correlate of our concept of desire, such that a single brain 
state can be isolated as involved in all cases we would term “desire” – and to claim 
that in the absence of one, the positing of desire is unscientific and unjustified. But 
there is obviously a great deal of heterogeneity in the phenomenological sensations of 
desire; we feel the desire for ice cream, the desire for world peace, and the desire not 
to be punched in the stomach in very different ways. Given that, it is natural to think 
that we may not find a single brain region responsible for all the things we think of as 




However, this should not be construed to show that desire phenomenology of this 
kind is merely an arbitrary and ad-hoc construct. I will not attempt to argue against 
full-scale eliminative materialism of the kind that denies the very existence of 
conscious states, but there are more moderate positions that question the degree to 
which (at least certain elements of) our folk-psychological vocabulary correspond to 
anything appropriately scientific.89 This leads to the other possibility, of claiming 
that looking for any neural correlates at all is mistaken, and that we should 
understand these terms as referring only to a social category. While desire is indeed a 
socially-relevant category, it is more than that, and is not an arbitrary construct of 
our particular society that could have been otherwise, even if it does not correspond 
exactly to one particular brain state or mechanism. Zenon Pylyshyn points out that a 
similar state of affairs likely obtains with things as uncontroversial as the ability to 
interpret pronouns.90 We know that this capacity exists and is possessed by humans 
in general (even hypothetical ones who do not presently speak a language that uses 
pronouns), and is not something we have arbitrarily created in a particular cultural 
context. The fact that the exact same mechanism is not at work in every instance of 
pronoun use or understanding does not show that it is illicit to refer to our ability to 
interpret pronouns, or that linguistic ability provides no explanation of our 
                                   
89 See for example Karl Friston, Jérémie Mattout and James Kilner “Action understanding and active 
inference”, Biological Cybernetics 104(1-2) (2011), which claims that seeing the brain as performing 
“active inference” does away with the idea of desires and shows them to be nothing more than action-
oriented perceptions, not relevantly distinct from beliefs. However, one interpretation of this claim is 
merely that “Desire [has been] relegated to a phenomenal sensation associated with this sequence of 
events, and does not seem to play any causal or functional role” (Joe Dewhurst, “Folk Psychology and 
the Bayesian Brain”, in Philosophy and Predictive Processing [2017]), which would give desire an 
epiphenomenalist position that is compatible with my arguments. The question then becomes which 
particular behaviours are accompanied by sensations that fit the criteria and which do not. The issue 
is with the claim that we ought to lump together whatever we happen to have shown correspond to a 
particular state and assume that something genuinely relevant cannot cut across these categories. 
90 Zenon Pylyshyn, “What’s in a Mind?”, Synthese 70 (1987). 
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behaviours or capacities. We need not find a single neural correlate for how we 
decide what pronouns refer to.  
There are at least two reasons that the appropriate explanation is one given 
in terms of beliefs, in spite of the fact that there can be no doubt that the 
behavior is caused by biological processes of some kind on each occasion. 
One reason is that it certainly need not be the case that the same neural or 
biochemical process is operative on every occasion where a pronoun is 
assigned a referent. This is just to repeat what I have already said before, 
namely that the category of behaviour we are interested in may cross 
classify behavior described using biological terminology, so that a 
psychological generalization may collapse across [a] disjunction of 
biologically distinct events.91 
The same might be said to apply to phenomenological desires. A number of distinct 
categories of mental events might make up the category we are interested in (i.e., 
morally relevant phenomenological desires), which is nonetheless real enough to 
constitute an appropriate component of a moral theory.  
 
However, though there is much of value in Pylyshyn’s argument, it should not be 
taken to have shown definitively that there is no purpose to examining the brain 
when it comes to desires, but only to have illustrated its limitations for certain 
purposes. This is because, while the phenomenal states we are concerned with are of 
course introspectable, their effects are often cognitively impenetrable. In the case of 
explaining and analysing the role of desire in the behaviour of a “normal” human, 
neuroscience may indeed have little usefulness. However, interpersonal comparisons 
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are often difficult if not impossible with a purely high-level approach, since each 
individual only has access to their own conscious states. Comparisons of neural 
activity levels, for example, can at least give evidence for similarity or divergence of 
intensity of sensations. Furthermore, people are unaware of the precise nature of the 
connections between their sensations and their behaviours. Individuals with various 
mental conditions are (of course) aware of what they experience, but might be 
unaware of exactly how it differs from the norm and whether this difference is in any 
way responsible for the difference in their abilities to perform certain tasks. These 
are especially prominent concerns when looking outside the human species. For this 
reason, even if there is not a single unified biological explanation of the phenomena 
under consideration but only a class of related events, looking into this disjunction of 
biologically distinct events will still be important. 
 
My methodology for this exercise will be as follows: first, establish categories that 
count as the sort of desire phenomenology moral theory is concerned with. There are 
of course as many different desire phenomenologies as there are desires, but we can 
nevertheless identify some broad categories, even if there might be borderline cases 
where it is not clear to which category they belong. Then, identify brain areas that 
seem to be responsible for them. A good way to do this is to identify disorders where 
the lack of sensations of that kind are a reported symptom. This should be sufficient 
evidence that we are talking about a (relatively) unified category of phenomenal 
experience for each subcategory. Then, we can see which behaviours and capacities 
are associated with activity in those areas, as well as which ones are inhibited by 
abnormal functioning in these areas caused by the disorders we have identified. This 
will give us a plausible account of what the functional roles of each type of desire 
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phenomenology are, and as such allow us to develop tests that could give evidence 
for the existence of desires.  
 
Categorizing desire is not an entirely straightforward task, but some generalisations 
can be made. There are different types of desire that do come apart, though often 
they will overlap. When we look to non-human animals, we will see some creatures 
possessing some but not all of them. This fits with some moral intuitions, that there 
could be a hierarchy of moral importance within the animal kingdom where some 
animals (like humans) have more moral importance than others. The different 
categories of desire could be argued to form a sort of loose hierarchy, leaving room 
for the position that more “complex”, abstracted forms of desire are more important 
(or perhaps even the only important, depending on one’s preferred moral position) 
contributors to moral standing, changing the relative moral importance of different 
creatures. I will not argue for or against such a position here, but only flag where this 
is a possible approach to match this moral intuition. 
 
The task, then, is to catalogue the various potential types of desire phenomenology, 
and see which abilities depend on them. We can then examine those to determine if 
some behaviours have a common dependence on these. I will examine three broad 
categories, which I will label: “wanting”, which I argue is the domain of the 
substantia nigra pars compacta, “caring”, which I claim to be the responsibility of 
the anterior cingulate cortex, and “ambition”, for which I believe the amygdala is 
responsible. Each is responsible for different tasks and abilities, but I will argue that 
ultimately all contribute to the ability to function socially and morally and make 
appropriate judgements in those domains, which might then be used as a reliable 




2. Reward and Wanting 
Possibly the most basic form of desire is the sensation involved with wanting things, 
characterised as their “incentive salience”.92 The paradigm case, of course, is the 
things we like and enjoy. Though it might be tempting therefore to see this purported 
desire sensation as merely synonymous with taking pleasure in it, this should not be 
understood as just pleasure in the simple-sensation sense. There are numerous 
problems that arise from thinking of it in that way (mentioned in previous chapters), 
and a slightly different understanding is both less problematic and more natural. 
Timothy Schroeder’s view includes a consequence like this, which he characterises as 
follows: 
“Imagine visiting a neighbor and seeing his young son busily raking leaves. 
After a while, the child comes in and announces he has finished his chore. 
“Wonderful,” says the father. “Now you can cook dinner!” The boy beams in 
delight. Curious, you asked why the boy was so happy, and the father 
explains the situation by saying “Oh, for Andrew, being allowed to cook is a 
reward.” In this vignette, the fact that being allowed to cook is a reward for 
Andrew is held to explain why it is that it pleases Andrew.”93 
It appears in this case that the way cooking is perceived, as rewarding, provided a 
causal explanation for why it was pleasurable, which is what we are concerned with. 
It is very natural to suppose that the boy experienced a desire-sensation, though one 
that cannot be identical with pleasure. This also explains how this type of desire can 
include enjoying more abstract things that are not linked to physical sensations of 
                                   
92 See Kent Berridge, “From prediction error to incentive salience: mesolimbic computation of reward 
motivation”, Eur J Neurosci. 35(7) (April 2012). 
93 Timothy Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire, p. 59. 
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pleasure, such as satisfying one’s intellectual curiosity or the schadenfreude 
satisfaction in seeing a rival fail. The desire sensation in these cases, in particular, 
should be thought of as a (frequent) cause of pleasure, though not identical to it. 
Perceiving something as desirable or rewarding (or phenomenally representing it as 
such, if one wants to use that terminology) usually leads to enjoying it, but a lack of a 
conventional sensation of pleasure is not evidence that this type of desire is not at 
work in any given case. 
 
3. Neural Correlates 
The ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra pars compacta (VTA/SNpC), parts 
of the dopamine system, have been identified as the source of the types of desire 
identified in the previous section. The dopamine system has been associated with a 
large number of sensations closely associated with desire, including motivation, 
reward and aversion, and sexual desire.94 We can also look at what subjective reports 
we get from people with pathologies of the VTA/SNpC, and see which differences are 
produced in their subjective experiences. The disorder of the SNpC that involves a 
deficiency of dopamine is Parkinson’s disease.95 A very commonly reported symptom 
of Parkinson’s is feelings of indifference and apathy – patients reported that they felt 
diminished interest in things involving both themselves and others.96 This is a 
paradigm case of failure of desire phenomenology. Thus, we can see that changes to 
the functioning of the VTA/SNpC affects desire.  
 
                                   
94 H.P. Rang, Pharmacology (2003), p. 476. 
95 Charles A. Davie, “A review of Parkinson's disease”, Br. Med. Bull. 86(1) (2008). 
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4. Behavioural/Functional Role 
The VTA/SNpC system is responsible for reward-reinforcement learning, which is 
seen in different abilities for training in different animals. The range of functions of 
the dopaminergic system varies across species, with even the simplest invertebrates 
possessing some such system, but only “a signaling molecule modulating motor 
circuits in response to salient environmental stimuli”, i.e. all it does is “modulate 
motor output and locomotor behavior”.97 When we look to mammals, we see 
“progressively more specialized functions in behavioral responses to rewarding or 
aversive stimuli as increasing levels of behavioral complexity evolved along with the 
evolution of more complex nervous systems,” including roles in aversion, reward, 
and arousal.98 The animals that possess these abilities to a greater extent are more 
able to be trained and “socialised” in particular ways. 
 
In Parkinson’s disease, apart from the motor control symptoms, the most common 
consequence is executive dysfunction,99 comprising difficulty in planning, cognitive 
flexibility, and initiating appropriate actions while inhibiting inappropriate actions. 
Dopamine agonists that are used to treat Parkinson’s, while alleviating some 
symptoms including the apathy, have a frequent side-effect of self-destructive 
behaviour due to lack of control over impulses and urges, including compulsive 
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gambling, binge eating, and abnormal sexual behaviour and hypersexuality.100, 101 
This is a case of inability to moderate desires, and problems with the ability to weigh 
immediate desires against considerations that usually override them. We can see, 
therefore, that treating the symptom that correlates with reduced desire causes an 
excess of desire, further supporting the belief that this is a correlate with the states 
we are concerned with. 
 
5. Behavioural Tests for This Property 
We now turn to what sort of specific, discrete test could reveal a deficiency in the 
type of desire controlled by the mesolimbic and dopaminergic system (as opposed to 
the general patterns of behaviour affecting one’s life previously described, which may 
necessitate observation over too long a timescale to count as a “test”). As has been 
established, Parkinson’s disease is the disorder associated with improper functioning 
of this system. Sufferers of Parkinson’s frequently exhibit problem in tests and trials 
that require rule acquisition and cognitive flexibility, as one might expect from the 
dopamine system’s role in reward and learning, causing Parkinson’s sufferers to 
perform significantly worse on certain rule-acquisition tasks. Performance of AI on 
learning-based tasks is an area that is being actively and intensively explored: 
machine learning and deep learning are some of the most researched areas of 
technology at the moment. Some have even expressed a belief that this research is 
what will lead to machines achieving moral personhood.  However, despite many 
                                   
100 Ceravolo R, Frosini D, Rossi C, Bonuccelli U (December 2009). "Impulse control disorders in 
Parkinson's disease: definition, epidemiology, risk factors, neurobiology and management". 
Parkinsonism Relat. Disord. 15 (Suppl 4): S111–5 
101 It is important to emphasize that I do not mean to suggest that sexual desire is the prime example 
of desire, even if “desire” used on its own unmodified in everyday conversation usually means 
something sexual. It is certainly a case of desire, but not some kind of platonic ideal of it. 
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exaggerated claims, machine deep learning has not approached human learning 
capacities. The “reward signals” referred to as being used in reinforcement systems 
to achieve learning are merely metaphorical, not functioning in remotely the same 
way as reward in humans and other animals, and as a result such machines are 
nowhere near the learning capacity of biological organisms.  
 
We can also look to non-human animals for evidence. Animals possessing with a 
robust role for this system, such as dogs and rats, learn and retain new behaviours 
readily.102 There are also animals that have behaviours that do not respond to this 
system, and these behaviours cannot be trained or taught in this way. Frogs, for 
instance, will invariably strike with their tongues at small objects moving through the 
air, and no amount of experiences where such objects with a certain property or 
coming from a certain source prove not to be edible and are in fact unpleasant will 
ever teach them to disregard those specific objects. This behaviour is not susceptible 
to learning and cannot be conditioned out.103  It might seem like there’s something 
wrong with the idea that this property correlates with anything of moral significance, 
since Pavlovian conditioning like this that causes dogs to develop such aversions is 
hardly seen as the quintessential behaviour of entities with the most moral 
importance. However, it is the capacity for this learning but the ability to resist such 
conditioning when it conflicts with even higher-level desires which is characteristic of 
high moral standing. This shows the capacity for more complex behaviour and 
                                   
102 See Mohammad-Reza Zarrindast, Zahra Farajzadeh, Parvin Rostami, Ameneh Rezayof, and 
Parvaneh Nourjah, “Involvement of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) in morphine-induced memory 
retention in morphine-sensitized rats”, Behavioural Brain Research 
163(1) (August 2005). 
103 See Teruyuki Hirakawa, Eiko Honda, Kuniaki Toyoshima, Soichiro Tomo. And Satoshi Nakahara, 
“Glossopharyngeal-hypoglossal nerve reflex of the frog in metamorphosis”, Archives of Oral Biology 
38(2) (February 1993) for a description of this mechanism. 
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desires. It is true that we might encounter a potential problem with the inability to 
tell the difference between entities that are incapable of such conditioning and those 
who are susceptible to it but so adept at overriding it that its influence is 
unobservable, but these capacities would presumably show themselves in other ways. 
At any rate such a being, capable of making correct decisions solely on the basis of 
pure reason is merely hypothetical and as such poses no problem for practical 
purposes. 
 
Unfortunately, many of the other tasks and competencies governed by the 
dopaminergic system and inhibited by Parkinson’s are difficult to test clinically. 
Problems with inhibiting inappropriate actions when they are based on innate, 
instinctive, and primal desires (leading to impulse control problems and excessive 
indulgence in gambling, food, sexual activity, etc.) cannot be examined in a clinical 
context easily. Any attempt to design an experiment to test Parkinson’s sufferers’ 
propensity to overindulge in food and sexual activity would almost certainly run into 
major ethical issues. Even if this could be tested, though, or if we take non-
experimental data as a measure, these are not things that apply to a synthetic 
artificial intelligence. There have been tests of gambling behaviour, and Parkinson’s 
sufferers do exhibit significantly worse-than-average functioning on these tasks.  
However, computers can easily perform perfectly on gambling tasks. It is trivial to do 
so with a program whose only capability is to calculate probabilities. This type of test 




The real challenge, for which this desire system is necessary in humans, is balancing 
many competing needs to maintain homeostasis and function within society. It is 
credible that a fully-independent android would need an analogous system to 
function correctly in these circumstances, without requiring constant intervention or 
maintenance. This would align with the intuitions behind the proposal of the 
“Embodied Turing Test”, where having and being able to competently control a body 
is the criteria being measured – and this test has even been proposed to relate to 
moral standing.  However, this approach has proven to not be sufficiently rigorous. 
People have proven far too ready to empathise with and ascribe moral standing to 
robots that are embodied and autonomous. Military robots with only the capacity for 
locomotion and self-righting have elicited significant moral responses from 
observers, despite this being clearly unjustified.  A better analogue is the “Total 
Turing Test” from Stevan Harnad,104 which argues that in addition to linguistic 
ability, an AI would need to have a body that enables it to do all the physical tasks 
humans can.  A variation is the Work Turing Test, which is the Total Turing Test 
minus the linguistic ability criterion from the original Turing Test, which is desirable 
in that it will better allow small children and animals that likely have moral standing 
to pass.105  
 
In Swisher, Dotov, and Chemero’s experiments with the Embodied Turing Test,106 
Sony AIBO robots controlled by remote human operators were compared to ones 
                                   
104 Stevan Harnad, “The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific 
Criterion”, SIGART Bulletin 3(4) (October 1992). 
105 Oliver Brock, “Physical Work Turing Test” Beyond the Turing Test Workshop at the Twenty-Ninth 
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15) (2015). 
106 Neal Swisher, Dobromir Dotov and Anthony Chemero, “Ascribing Moral Value and the Embodied 
Turing Test” (2009). 
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controlled by the AI software in interactions with human participants, mostly 
involving taking direction from the humans in an attempt to complete a task. 
Appropriate actions and subtle cues of body language might indeed be an 
indispensable part of this process, but there were some methodological hurdles with 
this particular experiment: for one, when asked which was human-controlled and 
which was computer-controlled, many participants said they thought the one that 
had performed better was AI controlled, due to not being familiar with the capacities 
of AI and perhaps assuming it would be more precise. When simply asked which had 
shown more mental sophistication, they mostly said the human-controlled one, 
which supports this theory. Also, neither the humans nor the software were 
particularly adept at controlling the robots, which again makes making the correct 
determination more difficult. This is an unfortunate limitation of the Turing Test 
procedure in general, in that it is influenced by the expectations and beliefs of the 
human subject to a great degree, which might not be uniform across participants or 
correct. However, this test remains somewhat promising, as current AI is still a long 
way from satisfying this standard. 
 
It might be thought that a deficiency with the Embodied Turing Test is that the use of 
the AIBO robot requires people to carry out actions with which they are very 
unfamiliar in virtue of being in control of a quadripedal dog-like body. It might be 
thought that it would be better to use something like the Honda ASIMO android for 
human interactions. However, it might also be desirable to test for dog-level ability 
rather than requiring AI to meet full human standards, and for that the AIBO would 
seem appropriate. If we want to test for a non-human animal level of understanding 
with a non-human animal body, perhaps it would be more appropriate for the 
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animals themselves to make the judgements of success. However, there is a major 
obstacle when it comes to dogs, in that so much of their social lives involve smell. We 
are not very well equipped to create AI that can produce smells, but that is obviously 
not relevant to their mental properties, which provides a significant obstacle in 
devising a dog Embodied Turing Test. This sort of thing is a general difficulty – part 
of the concept of the Turing Test is to remove irrelevant features and have it judged 
blindly with all participants on equal footing. As we introduce other components to 
the test, it becomes harder and harder to make it properly neutral and have no other 
way to differentiate participants. Asking human evaluators to ignore these features 
and focus only on the behaviours at issue is an imperfect solution, as it might not 
always be possible to prevent them from biasing one’s opinions, but it is at least a 
possibility. If we were to use non-human animals or very young children as 
evaluators, it will not be possible to do even that. 
 
For this reason, we should look for an animal for whom the salient features will be 
less difficult to duplicate. One possible candidate: sharks. A robot was created for the 
BBC to integrate socially with sharks in order to capture footage of them without 
their behaviour being influenced by the presence of humans.107 The results were 
mixed, and the “robo-shark” generally wasn’t accepted as a normal shark by the 
animals it was interacting with. This makes sense, as sharks do apparently have fairly 
complex systems of socialisation. The appearance of the shark should not have made 
much difference, as shark vision relies primarily on silhouettes, and so the subtle 
cues like seams in the metal and difference in lustre would not have been noticed. It’s 
possible that part of the problem may have been not emitting the right electrical and 
                                   
107 Smart Sharks: Swimming with Roboshark, BBC (2003). 
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magnetic fields, to which sharks are very sensitive, but this at least is easier to 
achieve with robots than smells. Thus, a shark Embodied Turing Test might be 
possible. 
 
There are other abilities that are impaired in dopaminergic disorders that might form 
the basis for different tests. Parkinson’s sufferers exhibit difficulty in facial 
recognition, having difficulty reading emotion, as well as mirroring facial expressions 
or portraying emotions on cue.108  This is another area that is being heavily 
researched for AI, and yet has not met with much success so far. From robot sex 
workers to robot actors,109 AI have been designed for many applications where 
competency with facial expressions would be desirable, and yet people report very 
little emotional connection with such robots, experiencing unease at seeing what is 
clearly meant to be an emotive expression that is clearly “wrong” in some way.110  
Simply reading and responding to human facial expressions is also desirable, for 
applications such as therapy for individuals with mental disabilities, general medical 
practice, and possibly military or police use of robots, all of which have seen a great 
deal of effort go into research for them. Nonetheless, AI recognition of expressions 
and emotional states in humans is not very successful as yet. 
                                   
108 Pell MD, Monetta L, Rothermich K, Kotz SA, Cheang HS, McDonald S, “Social perception in adults 
with Parkinson's disease”, Neuropsychology 28(6) (November 2014).  
109 For example, RoboThespian – see Shane Hickey, “RoboThespian: the first commercial robot that 
behaves like a person”, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/17/robothespian-engineered-arts-robot-
human-behaviour 
110 Response to the robot known as “Sophia” (see Oscar Raymundo “Meet Sophia, the female 
humanoid robot and newest SXSW celebrity”, PCWorld.com 
https://www.pcworld.com/article/3045299/meet-sophia-the-female-humanoid-robot-and-newest-
sxsw-celebrity.html) has been mixed, but Yann LeCun at least has called it “complete bullshit” (Shona 
Ghosh, "Facebook's AI boss described Sophia the robot as 'complete b------t' and 'Wizard-of-Oz AI'". 




Though some of the behaviours enabled by the mesocorticolimbic system are 
testable, many cannot be measured so rigorously. As we have seen, some of the 
deficiencies caused by Parkinson’s cannot be easily tested experimentally. Another 
problem with Parkinson’s as a comparison criterion is that it occurs almost 
exclusively in older people, mostly over 60 years old. Old age is not the paradigm 
case for learning and rule acquisition, as the vast majority of social learning occurs 
when young and as people age they lose a great deal of flexibility in learning novel 
things even without having any condition or impairment. There is no commonly-
occurring disorder of the dopaminergic system that manifests from birth, and so 
there is therefore not enough evidence available of how a person might develop with 
defects of the dopaminergic system. There is a significant difference between growing 
from childhood normally and later developing such a disorder, and having a disorder 
that affects learning from birth. Admittedly, there are still many questions about how 













Chapter IV: The Amygdala, Caring, and The Big Picture 
 
 
1. The Distinct Sensation of Caring 
This chapter will follow the same form as the previous one: I will explain the next 
form of desire (without attempting to give necessary or sufficient conditions, as 
sensations are almost never pure and distinct enough to do so), then present the 
neuroscience research on which brain areas produce activity that corresponds best 
with these feelings. This will be established by reference to what happens when there 
is a disorder or abnormality involving these brain areas, and what functions are 
inhibited. This will then be used to determine which behavioural capacities are 
enabled by these phenomenal sensations. I will then develop some ideas for self-
contained tests that one could employ to determine whether an entity has the 
capacity for the type of desire in question.  
 
In this case, the sensation I will describe as “caring” derives from the amygdala, and 
enables acting in a consistently morally appropriate manner. Evidence for this 
includes the fact that criminal psychopaths have abnormal amygdalar functioning, 
resulting in a deficiency of the relevant phenomenology and a corresponding inability 
to follow moral rules or even understand or articulate moral concepts. Based on this, 
a test for the capacity to have this type of desire could be a test of moral ability and 
moral reasoning, which could be devised to be conducted in a verbal or non-verbal 
way such that almost any entities possessing the capacity for this type of desire could 




The sensation of caring about something is distinct from the sensation of wanting. 
Caring, in the sense being discussed here, is more closely related to emotion than the 
simpler incentive salience-type of desiring described in the previous chapter. Caring 
about something somewhat abstract and removed from oneself, like that there be 
world peace or that your hometown sports team wins some game, is felt 
phenomenologically but in a very different way than immediate, personal, bodily 
sensations like hunger or sexual desire, for instance. Desires of this type are 
frequently not self-regarding, or at least are often very indirectly self-regarding, in a 
way that desires of the first kind are not. It is to be expected, therefore, that these will 
have a different source and different functional effects. 
 
2. The Neural Correlates – the Amygdala 
The amygdala is the area of the brain responsible for high-level complex decision-
making, as well as certain emotional responses. In particular, it seems to play a role 
in emotional learning, in which feelings one has affects one’s likelihood to retain 
information.111 Many psychopaths exhibit abnormal functioning of the amygdala. 
One of the standard symptoms in these cases is a “carefree nonplanness”, described 
as a lack of long-term goals and any kind of life plan, while feeling no pressure to find 
any such direction.112 This is a failure of desire, arising from a failure of specific 
                                   
111 See Gregory A. Clark, “Emotional Learning: Fear and loathing in the amygdala”, Current Biology 
5(3) (March 1995). 
112 The characteristics of psychopaths are defined in the Psychopathy Checklist, Revised (PCL-R)  (see 
R.D. Hare, Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist [1st ed.], [1991]) and the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory (PPI) (see Lilienfeld and Andrews “Development and preliminary validation of 
a self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits in noncriminal population”, Journal of 
personality assessment 66(3) [1996]). 
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phenomenology, and as such supports the claim that psychopathy and the brain 
areas responsible are central to this form of desire. 113 
 
The amygdala is also responsible for certain sensations, often described as fear, the 
absence of which is posited to be responsible for some differences in the behaviour of 
psychopaths – in effect, they do not care about certain things that an ordinary person 
would be frightened of.114 These psychopaths are not as bothered by the thought of 
pain, and respond to it differently, though they still possess self-preservation 
instincts that make them attempt to avoid injury. They show much less fear of pain, 
and their reactions to threat of pain has been measured to be much smaller than for 
normal people, though their reaction to the actual pain, as well as the degree to 
which they dislike it, is normal. In one experiment, psychopaths were shown a 
variety of stimuli, and one particular stimulus was correlated with them being 
subjected to painful pressure. Though their self-reports were that the pressure was 
just as painful as for non-psychopaths, they failed to associate any negative 
emotional valence with the stimulus that indicated the pain was imminent, and no 
significant arousal in response to anticipation of pain, leading them to fail to 
accomplish aversive learning, as compared with healthy control subjects that did.115 
This failure was associated with and explained by defects in functioning of the 
amygdala, which caused them not to care enough about the future pain. This is 
                                   
113 Niels Birbaumer, Ralf Veit, Martin Lotze, Michael Erb, Christiane Hermann, Wolfgang Grodd, and 
Herta Flor (2005), “Deficient Fear Conditioning in Psychopathy: A Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Study”, Arch Gen Psychiatry 62 (July 2005). 
114 Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D. G. V., Richell, R. A., Kelly, S., Leonard, A., Newman, C., and S. K. Scott 
“Turning a deaf ear to fear: Impaired recognition of vocal affect in psychopathic individuals”, Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology 111(4) (2002). 
115 William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd, “Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of 
Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories”, in Brain Theory: Essays in Critical 
Neurophilosophy (2014), p.150. 
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evidence that psychopaths have differences in their phenomenal states, but not in 
perceptions of pleasure and pain; the difference is in their phenomenology of desire. 
 
3. Associated Behavioural Capacities – Moral Action  
Psychopaths fall into different categories depending (in part) on the degree to which 
they are able to function normally in society. Many college students and people 
working in business and industry display the characteristics of psychopathy, but have 
remained successful in their fields and endeavours. 116 In fact, some of these 
characteristics might be predictive of personal business success – features like 
insincere charm, high but fragile self-esteem, and entitlement and self-centeredness 
can help drive individual achievement, even if general outcomes are frequently 
bad.117 This is in stark contrast to psychopathic criminals and serial killers who have 
been apprehended and institutionalised. “Successful” psychopaths, those who 
maintain normal lives and careers and avoid prison, have been shown not to exhibit 
abnormal functioning of the amygdala and as a result do not have the same absence 
of fear and other emotions that criminal psychopaths exhibit.118 They still have the 
insincere charm, egocentricity, and grandiose sense of self-worth that characterises 
psychopaths, yet have still managed to form and execute long-term life plans, and so 
we have evidence that the presence of the phenomenal states that depend on the 
amygdala are what allow for the capacity for long-term planning associated with 
                                   
116 Paul Babiak, Craig S. Neumann, and Robert D. Hare, “Corporate Psychopathy: Talking the Walk”, 
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 28 (2010). 
117 Jonathan Hassall, Daniel Boduszek, and Katie Dhingra, “Psychopathic traits of business and 
psychology students and their relationship to academic success”, Personality and Individual 
Differences 82 (August 2015). 
118 Gao and Raine, "Successful and unsuccessful psychopaths: A neurobiological model." Behavioral 
Sciences & the Law 28(2) (2010). 
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desires, as well the ability to act morally to a sufficient degree to have a successful 
career and escape punishment.  
 
Psychopaths with abnormal amygdalar functioning have difficulty with forming long-
term plans, and with learning and applying social and moral rules, and as a result 
frequently end up committing crimes and becoming institutionalised. However, not 
all psychopaths ever end up actually committing severe crimes, and even those that 
do, do not do so especially frequently. That is to say, by general standards of 
frequency, not standards specific to murder – if someone has killed three or four 
people, that is rather a lot, and it might not be unreasonable to say that this person is 
constantly killing people. By contrast, if someone had three or four cups of tea in 
their life one would not say that they were constantly drinking tea. The point is, even 
in observing such a person for several days or even weeks, it would be exceedingly 
unlikely to observe them actually committing a murder. As a result, this is not a good 
behaviour to track and test for. Psychopaths do, however, have other, more everyday 
deficiencies that are easier to observe. One of the major ones is failure of moral 
reasoning, and misuse of the moral and social-conventional vocabulary. They are 
incompetent in the use of moral concepts, and attempt to emulate what they have 
heard from “normal” people, and the result is speech that bears a superficial 
resemblance to appropriate and typical utterances in these contexts, but is 
contradictory and nonsensical. Prominent psychopathy researcher Robert Hare 
reports many examples of this:119 
                                   




“My mother is a great person, but I worry about her. She works too hard. I 
really care for that woman, and I’m going to make it easier for her.” When 
asked about the money he had stolen from her he replied, “I’ve still got some 
of it stashed away, and when I get out it’s party time!” 
 
A woman with a staggering record of fraud, deceit, lies, and broken 
promises concluded a letter to the parole board with, "I've let a lot of people 
down… One is only as good as her reputation and name. My word is as good 
as gold."  
 
When asked if he experienced remorse over a murder he’d committed, one 
young inmate told us, “Yeah, sure, I feel remorse.” Pressed further, he said 
that he didn’t “feel bad inside about it.”  
 
I was once dumbfounded by the logic of an inmate who described his murder 
victim as having benefited from the crime by learning "a hard lesson about 
life."  
This is caused by their emotional deficiencies and inability to attach the correct 
affective significance to morally-loaded terms. To use this language competently, one 
need understand not only the semantic content but the affective valence, the 





4. The Tests – Moral Reasoning Tasks 
Let us turn to plausible tests that could establish whether an otherwise-sophisticated 
AI lacks the same capacities as criminal psychopaths. Obviously it is not an 
appropriate test to just see if a robot tries to murder someone, and merely not trying 
to murder anyone is not a sufficient test. However, using moral vocabulary is a much 
more promising route – in effect, this constitutes a modification of the Turing Test to 
focus on more appropriate subject matter. If a machine could consistently use moral 
and socio-conventional terms competently, that would provide evidence that it may 
be able to experience the right sorts of feelings, which would be reason to treat it as if 
it had moral standing. 
 
An imagined test for this might resemble the “Voight-Kampff Test” from the film 
Blade Runner more than the traditional Turing Test.120 In the test portrayed in the 
film, artificial agents are subjected to “questions designed to provoke an emotional 
response” – a series of hypotheticals about morally-charged situations, such as 
violence done to various types of non-human animal, or potential romantic infidelity. 
The participants are then evaluated based on their reactions. The use in fiction of this 
test procedure indicates that it is to some extent pre-theoretically intuitive as a test 
procedure. 
 
While we do not have a defined, operationalised Voight-Kampff test prodecure as yet, 
we can look at how well current machines perform relevantly similar tasks. Below is a 
transcript of the result of attempting to discuss moral and ethical issues with a 
                                   
120 Blade Runner (1982), dir. Ridley Scott, Warner Bros. 
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Google-designed chat program.121 It is important to note that this is not a cherry-
picked bad example – this case was reported in the media as a major breakthrough in 
AI, in a number of sensationalist articles, describing the AI as “exasperated” and 
“lashing out” without qualification (though these articles did sometimes cherry-pick 
the best responses or even slightly edit the transcript to appear more natural).122  I 
present the exchange in its entirety to allow for fully-informed evaluation:  
Human: what is moral?  
Machine: what empowered humanity, what 
intellectual the essence is.  
Human: what is immoral?  
Machine: the fact that you have a child.  
Human: what is morality?  
Machine: what is altruism?  
Human: what is the definition of altruism?  
Machine: if you don’t believe in god , then you 
don ’t know.  
Human: ok... so what is the definition of 
morality?  
Machine: well, the truth is, you’re not a 
believer in god almighty.  
Human: tell me the definition of morality, i 
am quite upset now!  
Machine: i m not ashamed of being a 
philosopher!  
Human: tell me the definition of morality.  
Machine: i don’t have ethics.  
Human: look, i need help, i need to know 
more about morality...  
Machine: i don’t know what ethics is.  
Human: seriously, what is morality?  
Machine: what is the definition of living?  
Human: why living has anything to do with 
morality?  
                                   
121 Oriol Vinyals and Quoc V. Le, “A Neural Conversational Model” in: Proceedings of the 31st 
International Conference on Machine Learning, Volume 37 (2015). 
122 See The Wall Street Journal, https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/26/artificial-intelligence-
machine-gets-testy-with-its-programmers/ 
Machine: you’re not a cop.  
Human: okay, i need to know how should i 
behave morally ...  
Machine: i don’t know how to tell you.  
Human: is morality and ethics the same?  
Machine: yes , sir.  
Human: what are the things that i do to be 
immoral?  
Machine: i don’t know.  
Human: give me some examples of moral 
actions...  
Machine: i’m not a moralist.  
Human: alright, morality ?  
Machine: integrity.  
Human: what is integrity ?  
Machine: i’m sorry, i don’t know what else to 
say.  
Human: be moral!  
Machine: be a man!  
Human: i really like our discussion on 
morality and ethics ...  
Machine: and how i’m not in the mood for a 
philosophical debate.  




This is clearly not competent speech, and it is much farther from passing the Turing 
Test than what has been achieved in the topic-restricted (non-moral) contexts where 
AI has managed comparative success. It is filled with non-sequiturs, and instances of 
seemingly being dramatic and impassioned at utterly inappropriate times (“you’re 
not a cop”, “I am not ashamed of being a philosopher!”, “be a man!” etc.).123 
 
If this sort of social and moral competence is to be the measure we focus on, we 
should look to extant tests designed to detect this kind of capacity. In fact, such tests 
have been designed and carried out on organic subjects, with interesting and 
remarkable results. As has been mentioned, even very young children certainly have 
moral standing, and have similar phenomenal states to adult humans, but are unable 
to pass the Turing Test owing to their inability to read and write, and often to 
comprehend language at all. However, even pre-linguistic children have been shown 
to have the ability to apply moral principles in a consistent and reasonable way. 
Various experiments have been conducted where children as young as 3 months old 
observed or interacted with puppets in various situations. In one of these trials, two 
puppets were each shown helping and hindering another. Attention and looking 
times indicated that the children were accurately conceptualising these events as 
positively and negatively valenced, i.e. as “good” and “bad” respectively. Children 
were then asked to physically choose one of the puppets, and consistently chose the 
“good”, helpful puppet over the “bad”, uncooperative puppet.124 Other versions of 
                                   
123 As a technical note, the materials used to train the program on language use was a huge database of 
film subtitles, which might account for this flair for the dramatic. 
124 J. Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn and Paul Bloom, “Social evaluation by preverbal infants”, Nature 
450:22 (November 2007), also confirmed in J. Kiley Hamlin and Karen Wynn, “Young infants prefer 
prosocial to antisocial others”, Cognitive Development 26(1) (2011). 
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this experiment was conducted where children were asked to reward or punish such 
puppets, again getting the same sort of results. Most interestingly, experiments were 
conducted where other puppets administered reward or punishment to puppets that 
had previously been observed being cooperative or uncooperative, and the infants 
evaluated the very same actions more positively only when performed against an 
entity that had previously performed actions to deserve it.125 
This exhibits fairly sophisticated moral understanding: the children consistently 
favoured puppets who had helped others and disfavoured those who had harmed 
others – unless the harmful actions were only directed at other puppets who had 
previously been observed acting badly themselves, to punish the puppets who 
deserved it. This involves fairly complex social and moral concepts, and while one 
could disagree with this being the morally “correct” course of action, it is at least 
defensible as a principle.  
 
In another experiment, three-year-old children collaborated with a puppet on a task, 
and were then given a reward that they could share how they saw fit. When they had 
been helped by the puppet, the children consistently chose to altruistically share 
their reward, and the amount shared was proportional to the degree to which the 
puppet had been helpful and cooperative.126  
 
                                   
125 Karen Wynn and Paul Bloom, “The Moral Baby”, in Handbook of Moral Development, ed. Melanie 
Killen and Judith G. Smetana (2013). 
126 Patricia Kanngiesser and Felix Warneken, “Young Children Consider Merit when Sharing 
Resources with Others”, PLOS ONE 8(8) (2013). 
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On the other hand, psychopaths, as we have seen, consistently fail at performing 
similar tasks, not being observed to employ any recognizable moral principle in 
assigning blame or determining desert for reward. Though such an experiment does 
not seem to have been conducted yet, I expect that criminal psychopaths would 
perform worse on the puppet task than even very the young neurotypical children. 
 
It would also be desirable to test for a level of capacity possessed by non-human 
animals. Corvids, such as ravens, have exhibited something like a concept of fairness 
and justice, and in cooperative tasks will react adversely when there is an inequality 
of reward relative to the amount of work each participant performed.127 The same is 
true of animals such as primates and dogs, but not of animals such as fish. In the 
experiments, ravens refused to continue to work when rewards were sufficiently 
unequal, even when it would benefit them to continue. Some might respond by 
saying that this is not due to any sense of fairness or justice, but simply a way to 
attempt to enforce better outcomes for themselves, regardless of desert. First, this 
line of thinking could be equally applied to humans, denying that we act out of 
motives of fairness or justice. Even if actions like this could be advantageous to us, 
people do not generally give explanations in these terms, or even discuss or consider 
these explanations or seem aware of them as a possibility. If we do not engage in 
such complex pragmatic reasoning, it seems strange to insist that the birds do.  
 
Rats have also been tested for their degree of moral understanding, in particular 
their willingness to make personal sacrifices for others, making them choose between 
                                   
127  Claudia A.F. Wascher and Thomas Bugnyar, “Behavioral Responses to Inequity in Reward 
Distribution and Working Effort in Crows and Ravens”, PLoS ONE 8(2) (2013). 
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different courses of action when something morally or socially significant was at 
stake. 128 In one experiment, rats were put into a situation where a reward was 
available to them, but another rat was imprisoned or confined where they had the 
ability to free them. The other rat was either merely confined, in a position where 
there was the illusion that they were submerged in water, or actually standing in a 
small amount of water, which is somewhat distressing to rats. The rats were 
separated from each other, and could not reach each other even when freed, to 
control for the possibility that the rats were acting out of a desire for companionship. 
The reward used was chocolate, which is preferred to almost anything, but rats would 
forgo chocolate to help other rats when they were perceived to be imprisoned or in 
danger. In some of these tests they varied the amount of chocolate, which affected 
when they would save rats that were merely confined, but they consistently saved 
those that were in immediate distress.129 They also were reliably able to tell whether 
the other rat was in genuine distress. This, once again, involves being able to apply 
fairly sophisticated moral principles (i.e., sensitive to subtle changes in the situation). 
 
The trouble with using this exact procedure is that it might be possible to program an 
AI to err on the side of caution and always be absolutely altruistic, attempting to help 
before anything else if there’s even the slightest possibility it’s necessary. Though it 
might still be difficult to evaluate harm and danger and what the appropriate way to 
alleviate them is, it becomes much easier when one is not also weighing one’s own 
well-being and what level of sacrifice is required. What we might need to do is make 
                                   
128 Shayna A. Wrighten and Chelsea R. Hall, “Support for Altruistic Behavior in Rats”, Open Journal of 
Social Sciences (2016)4. 
129 Inbal Ben-Ami Bartal, Jean Decety and Peggy Mason, “Helping a cagemate in need: empathy and 
pro-social behavior in rats” Science 334(6061) (December 2011). 
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it so that taking a given course of action would actually be morally bad in certain 
circumstances, or force a choice between helping two entities, one of which doesn’t 
actually need help, and see how well the AI can analyse those situations. There is also 
a problem in that it might be necessary that the participant believe the danger or 
distress is real to get an accurate measure of response. This would raise serious 
ethical issues for conducting this type of experiment Turing Test-style – certainly it 
would be impossible to get approval to conduct such an experiment with humans 
instead of rats, and an AI might be more like humans than rats in terms of its moral 
properties (of course, some would argue that it’s already unethical to be performing 
these experiments on rats). 
 
To my knowledge, nobody has designed a robot to subject to this particular test, but 
robots that have similar skills are actually one of the best-funded areas of research, 
due to the interest in them for military applications. There exists an ambition to 
develop autonomous machines that can make moral decisions in combat situations, 
and determine which individuals are the “good guys” and the “bad guys”. Recently, 
the US government has solicited assistance with the Advanced Targeting and 
Lethality Automated System (ATLAS), which intends to “leverage recent advances in 
computer vision and Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning (AI/ML) to develop 
autonomous target acquisition technology, that will […] acquire, identify, and engage 
targets at least 3X faster than the current manual process”.130 However, they 
amended the solicitation to make clear that decisions to fire would not be automated, 
and that humans would ultimately be in final control of such determinations, out of 
                                   
130 “Industry Day for the Advanced Targeting and Lethality Automated System (ATLAS) Program”. 
Solicitation Number: W909MY-19-R-C004. 
https://www.fbo.gov/index.php?id=6b5d5aeb584c667d4e6f5103bf6acac6 
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justified concern that AI technology would be capable of making such decisions to a 
sufficient standard of accuracy in the near future. Despite repeated efforts over 
previous years, this capability has not been achieved, and the prospects of success in 
this enterprise have been questioned by those studying it. From Marcello Guarini 
and Paul Bello:  
Consider a counterinsurgency operation in a Sikh village… Three children 
and their two parents are present at [a] residence. Two of the male children 
are young and playing with a ball. Each is also carrying the Sikh kirpan… 
Just before a member of the counterinsurgency force kicks the door in, one of 
the boys kicks his ball toward the door, and both go chasing after it. As 
military forces enter the house, they see two young boys running toward 
them, and a shocked mother yelling. She chases the boys and yells at them to 
stay away from the men at the door; the troops do not know what she is 
yelling, since they do not understand her language. It is quite possible that 
the forces in question will rapidly see this as a situation where two young 
children are playing, and a mother frightened for her children is yelling and 
giving chase…  
 
Let us consider a second interpretation. There are two fast-closing possible 
targets, both of which are carrying a weapon. A third possible target is 
following the first two, and is making a level of noise consistent with violent 
or threatening behavior.131 
  
Guarini and Bello are not optimistic about the likelihood of a robot succeeding at 
making the right determination, precisely because of the difficulty in ascribing the 
right mental states to the people involved. One of the major factors required is 
knowledge of the emotional states, for which an unfeeling machine can have no 




                                   
131 Marcello Guarini and Paul Bello, “Robotic Warfare: Some Challenges in Moving from Noncivilian 
to Civilian Theaters”, in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (2012), p. 130. 
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Chapter V: The ACC, Planning, and Ambition 
 
1.  The Sensation of Ambition 
There is another type of desire, distinct from both the “wanting” and “caring” 
sensations described in the previous chapters, that might be termed “ambition”. This 
involves feelings about life plans and long-term goals, distinct from the sensation of 
considering things that are more immediate and specific, including the desire to eat a 
juicy peach or feelings of aversion towards an action that would harm innocents. This 
sensation is associated with the anterior cingulate cortex, or ACC, a part of the brain 
disorders of which cause conditions such as major depressive disorder. In major 
depressive disorder, motivation is significantly reduced, leading to an inability to 
form and execute life plans and achieve a successful and happy life, instead leading 
to a repetitive “rut”. Tests for possessing this type of desire will therefore involve 
testing for either a reported or observed capacity to make reasonable and informed 
decisions about one’s own life. 
 
Yet another phenomenology of desire is involved in having long-term desires, which 
is related to plans and ambitions. The phenomenology of these is different from the 
simple in-the-moment wanting-or-not-wanting self-regarding desires described in 
chapter III. It feels very different, and has very different effects, to desire to become 
the greatest rock star in history, or to desire that your children be happy and healthy, 
than it does to want some ice cream, or some heroin. These types of desire also come 
apart, and the capacity for one can exist in an entity without the other. Many animals 
that have the “wanting” sensations do not appear to have any ability to form long-
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term life plans – dogs, for instance, feel the desire for meat but not for “success”, as 
they cannot even entertain the concept of success. Human children of sufficiently 
young age also have the capacity for the former type and not the latter, gradually 
developing the capacity as they mature.  
 
The long-term planning type of desire is also different from the “caring” type of 
desire in many relevant respects – it has a very different emotional profile, and is not 
as abstract and outwardly-directed. Furthermore, this is a distinction that frequently 
makes a difference in moral theory – it has been asserted132 that only desires about 
one’s whole life really contribute to well-being, excluding more immediate desires 
that do not involve considering the entire fabric of one’s life.  This might be used as a 
distinction that gives humans higher moral importance than non-human animals, if 
desired.  
 
2. Neural Correlates – The Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is responsible for perception of affective valence 
and for decision-making. Its function has been described as “associating an 
appropriate response within a given context, monitoring the outcome of the action, 
and switching behaviors when outcomes are not as expected” – in particular, “the 
rostroventral ACC tracks the affective evaluation of response outcomes”, “evaluating 
the motivational or affective consequence” of outcomes.133 That is to say, it informs 
                                   
132 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984), p. 497 on “global” desire theory – see also 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and 
Contemporary Ethics (2014), p. 221 on the claim that these always trump other types for a given 
individual. 
133 Phan Luu and Stacey M. Pederson, "The Anterior Cingulate Cortex: Regulating Actions in Context", 
in Cognitive Neuroscience of Attention (2004). 
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the positive or negative feelings about potential results of one’s action, and enables 
learning of more reliable decision-making responses to achieve the good outcomes. 
 
The ACC is also very distinctive neurologically.  It is made up primarily of spindle 
neurons, a special type of cell found only in highly advanced species such as great 
apes and cetaceans. 134,135 These neurons enable “fast information processing and 
transfer along highly specific projections [and] evolved in relation to emerging social 
behaviors”.136 The fact that they are present only in some of the more cognitively 
advanced species that have the greatest claim to moral standing provides support for 
the claim that we have correctly identified a property as morally important. Many 
people have the intuition that humans and at a select few other cognitively advanced 
animal species have moral significance much greater (perhaps even of a different 
kind) than that of other animals. The significant difference in neural structure in a 
part of the brain associated with a certain type of phenomenology and desire 
provides a principled reason and justification for this intuition. Of course, one could 
deny that there is any great intrinsic difference between the moral standing of 
humans and all other animal species, and to accommodate this one need only claim 
that there is no difference in the importance of different types of desire. In that case 
the other animal species that do not possess the capacity for this type of desire but 
                                   
134 John Allman, Atiya Hakeem, Esther Nimchinsky, and Patrick Hof, “The Anterior Cingulate Cortex”, 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 935 (2006). 
135 Of course phrases like “highly evolved” and “advanced” have no real biological meaning, as all 
extant animal species are equally “evolved”, whether they are simple or complex. Referring to more 
“intelligent” species of course misses the point of this project, as I have made clear. I mean only to 
point to the common folk belief of the existence of such a hierarchy, where these species are higher 
and thus more important than others, which I believe to be somewhat reliable in tracking properties of 
moral importance. 
136 Butti C, Sherwood CC, Hakeem AY, Allman JM, Hof PR, “Total number and volume of Von 
Economo neurons in the cerebral cortex of cetaceans”, The Journal of Comparative Neurology 515(2) 
(July 2009). 
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possess the others will have their desires treated as equally important, and will differ 
only in the amount and intensity of their desires. In this way we can once again 
remain neutral and accommodate many different moral intuitions, while providing 
potential justifications for some of the options. 
 
The ACC is also strongly correlated with emotional consciousness. More emotional 
awareness strongly correlates with increases in ACC activity, suggesting that 
deficiencies in emotional perception might be caused by a lack of appropriate 
operation of the ACC in processing these experiences.137 This emotional awareness 
which is associated with response choice and decision-making might constitute a 
phenomenological component of desires. Furthermore, problems with the ACC are 
correlated with, and have been theorised to be a cause of, major depressive 
disorder.138,139 Depression is in part phenomenological in nature – “Major depressive 
disorder is characterized by symptoms in affective, somatic, and cognitive 
domains”,140 and the affective component is most salient in people’s impression of 
depression. It is strongly associated with abnormality of emotions and failure of 
desire. Inability to feel any sort of excitement or enjoyment about anything, and the 
                                   
137 Lane RD, Reiman EM, Axelrod B, Yun LS, Holmes A, Schwartz GE, “Neural correlates of levels of 
emotional awareness. Evidence of an interaction between emotion and attention in the anterior 
cingulate cortex”, J Cogn Neurosci. 10(4) (July 1998). “…This finding suggests that individual 
differences in the ability to accurately detect emotional signals interoceptively or exteroceptively may 
at least in part be a function of the degree to which the ACC participates in the experiential processing 
and response to emotion cues.” 
138 David Cotter, Daniel Mackay, Sabine Landau et al. “Reduced Glial Cell Density and Neuronal Size 
in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Major Depressive Disorder”. Arch Gen Psychiatry 58(6) (2001). 
“These findings suggest that there is reduced frontal cortical glial cell density and neuronal size in 
major depressive disorder.” 
139 Christopher G. Davey, Murat Yücel, Nicholas B. Allen, and Ben J. Harrison, “Task-related 
deactivation and functional connectivity of the subgenual cingulate cortex in major depressive 
disorder”, Front. Psychiatry (28 February 2012). “The study reinforces the importance of [the 
subgenual anterior cingulate cortex] for depression, and demonstrates how dysfunctional connectivity 
with ventral brain regions might influence executive–attentional processes.” 
140 Ibid. 
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consequent inability to feel any motivation, is the main characterising feature of 
depression. Depression has also been argued to have an adaptive functional 
explanation related to desire and well-being – the hypothesis is that diminishment of 
desire protects from significant decreases in well-being from frustration of strong 
desires or being exposed to stimulus to which one has a strong aversion.141 
Phenomenological symptoms of depression such as low-level sadness and anhedonia 
allow for “a withdrawal from contact with the world and the consequences of activity” 
and constitute “the conservation-withdrawal response to excesses or deficits of 
stimulation.”142 This is posited to be why depression is a common consequence of 
illnesses that have chronic pain as a symptom – while the negative result is an 
inability to derive joy from anything that would be desired in the absence of the 
depression, maintaining the same level of desires and aversions in the face of a 
situation where things are running counter to them would be costlier than reducing 
the level of desire and aversion and consequently losing some of their motivational 
force to form and follow long-term plans or do much of anything besides go through 
the motions of a minimal routine. 
 
Cingulotomy is a procedure frequently used to treat depression, and chronic pain 
that causes depression, in a way that prevents its more negative consequences.143 It 
involves severing the connections between the anterior cingulate cortex and the rest 
of the limbic system. Patients it is performed on report no longer being so bothered 
by negative things, such as pain and misfortune. They continue to report that they 
                                   
141 M. Y. Bolling, R. J. Kolenberg, and C. R. Parker, “Behavior analysis and depression,” in Clinical 
Behaviour Analysis (1999). 
142 Ibid., p. 127. 
143 J.D. Steele et al., “Anterior cingulotomy for major depression: clinical outcome and relationship to 
lesion characteristics”. Biological Psychiatry 63(7) (2008). 
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feel pain to the same degree, but say that they no longer mind it so much – in effect, 
that they are not as averse to it, and have less of a desire for it to end.144 According to 
neurosurgeons, “anterior cingulotomy for chronic pain aims to modulate patients' 
attention or emotional reaction to pain rather than to modulate pain intensity”145 – a 
description that, while not using the same vocabulary, sounds like it refers to 
affecting phenomenal desires and aversions. This would explain why depression is no 
longer a necessary adaptive response – the patient’s desires and aversions involving 
pain are no longer strong enough to necessitate depression to bring about an overall 
reduction in desire/aversion. This results in a phenomenological difference, but one 
that cannot be explained in terms of intensity of pleasure and pain, and is thus strong 
evidence for phenomenological desire.  
 
Cingulotomy has also been used to treat obsessive/compulsive disorder (OCD), 
which involves irresistible yet irrational urges to perform certain actions. 
Cingulotomy often reduced or eliminated these compulsions, but occasionally had 
the side effect of producing apathy.146 This is a case where a defect in the ACC causes 
a strong desire that leads to prioritisation of an irrelevant activity, which negatively 
affects the subject’s ability to fulfil their life-plan, and where modification to the ACC 
for the cure can cause a deficiency in desires. 
 
                                   
144 Though, as the bard has it, I would rather have a bottle in front of me, than a bilateral cingulotomy. 
145 Sharim J and Pouratian N, “Anterior Cingulotomy for the Treatment of Chronic Intractable Pain: A 
Systematic Review”, Pain Physician 19(8) (2016). 
146 Dougherty et al., “Prospective Long-Term Follow-Up of 44 Patients Who Received Cingulotomy for 
Treatment-Refractory Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder”, Am J Psychiatry 159(2) (2002). 
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3. Behavioural/Functional Role – Social Integration and Personal 
Life Planning 
The ACC appears to have some responsibility for understanding of social processes, 
including social appraisal and exclusion. There are pronounced differences in 
activation patterns in these tasks between individuals who suffer from depression 
and those who do not.147 This gives support to the theory of its role in 
phenomenology as well as our functional story. However, the main relevant role is in 
forming a life plan and working towards it. Those suffering from depression are 
usually unable to make efforts to make a change in their lives or work towards a 
better situation. In extreme cases, suicide results from an inability to envision a 
future for oneself – this happens in 2-8% of cases of depression.148  
 
One model of depression that formerly was in vogue was the “learned helplessness” 
model, where aversive situations beyond one’s control cause apathy and a 
discontinuation of attempts to avoid aversive stimuli. However, it has since been 
discovered that this is the default, and what is actually “learned” is the ability to take 
control when the opportunity presents itself.149 The ability to conceive of oneself as in 
control and capable of bringing about a situation for oneself far in the future, while 
accounting for the many complex features of one’s environment and society, is one of 
the most advanced forms of this capacity. 
 
                                   
147 Dedovic, K; Slavich, GM; Muscatell, KA; Irwin, MR; Eisenberger, NI, “Dorsal Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex Responses to Repeated Social Evaluative Feedback in Young Women with and without a 
History of Depression”, Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience 10(6) (2016). 
148 Strakowski and Nelson, Major Depressive Disorder (2015). 
149 Maier, Steven F. and Seligman, Martin E. P. "Learned helplessness at fifty: Insights from 
neuroscience". Psychological Review 123(4) (July 2016). 
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4. The Tests – Personal Prudential Social Judgements 
Disorders of the anterior cingulate cortex produce a number of noticeable 
deficiencies in performing certain tasks. The most common clinically-measured one 
associated with major depressive disorder associated with problems in the ACC is 
substandard performance on the Emotional Stroop Task, which involves correctly 
identifying properties of emotionally-loaded words.150 A series of words, some 
emotionally-loaded and some neutral, are shown in different colours, and the 
subjects must identify which colour they are. Depressed participants name the colour 
of depressing words slower than they do for neutral words.151 However, the nature of 
this test is such that it is not that proper phenomenal functioning is necessary for 
success and abnormal functioning disrupts it, but rather that the emotional 
responses are entirely superfluous and abnormal ones are only a distraction. 
Complete lack of the relevant states would actually be an asset on this test, as it 
would permit focusing only on the colour properties of the text. This, therefore, is not 
promising as a test of AI capacities. It has been suggested, however, that other 
clinical tests need to be devised because of other significant effects of conditions like 
major depressive disorder. It has been proposed that an amendment or addendum 
be made to the MacArthur Competence Assessment Trial – Treatment, or MacCAT-
T, which is the test used to determine whether patients are capable of making their 
own medical treatment decisions.152 In this form of the MacCAT-T, patients would be 
required to articulate their values and desires for the future, and reason about how 
                                   
150 Ben-Haim MS, Williams P, Howard Z, Mama Y, Eidels A, Algom D, "The Emotional Stroop Task: 
Assessing Cognitive Performance under Exposure to Emotional Content". Journal of Visualized 
Experiments 112 (June 2016). 
151 Gotlib IH, McCann CD, “Construct accessibility and depression: an examination of cognitive and 
affective factors”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47(2) (August 1984). 
152 Gerben Meynen, “Depression, possibilities, and competence: A phenomenological perspective”, 
Theor. Med. Bioeth. 32(3) (June 2011). 
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potential choices would affect them and what the benefits and drawbacks are. 
Effectively, it involves having a robust understanding of one’s own long-term well-
being. Unfortunately, this returns us to a type of test that requires significant 
linguistic ability, and as such once again excludes young children and non-human 
animals. In effect, this is just a topic-specific version of the original Turing Test, 
requiring competent answers to questions and correct social interaction, but 
confining it to a topic that will (likely) be more difficult for AI to succeed with. This 
might be more appropriate when we are dealing with a type of desire that is much 
less widespread than other types, controlled by a brain region with a structure 
exclusive to humans and a few other highly-social animals (though we would be 
excluding great apes, cetaceans, and elephants despite them possessing similar 
structures in the ACC, though it is not clear the extent to which their desires are the 
same as those of humans). As decisions like those involved with the MacCAT-T are 
often very complex weighings of multiple considerations, it is likely that the 
phenomenological states in question would be necessary, and thus it would be 
appropriate for this test to be used to evaluate AI. 
 
Another test that we can use in this case, despite it not being a viable option for the 
previous type of desire, is to wait to simply see whether they exhibit the associated 
behaviours outside of a laboratory testing-like situation. This of course was not viable 
when the capacity in question was other-directed moral competence – we cannot 
have entities running around that might be liable to harm or murder human beings. 
But there is no corresponding problem with having entities running around that 
cannot form ambitions or long-term plans for themselves. If an entity can otherwise 
behave safely and suitably in society, we can allow it to act autonomously, and if it 
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comes to exhibit the ability to form and articulate a coherent, well thought-out life 
ambition, then we might thereby become obligated to grant it commensurate moral 
standing and the right to be permitted and helped to achieve it. 
 
5. Towards a Unified Theory 
The type of functional feature common to the different types of desire is social 
and/or moral competencies. The VTA/SNpC enables basic learning of social rules 
and behaviour, and problems with its function, such as Parkinson’s disease, have 
symptoms that involve violations of these rules and norms of behaviour and cause 
strain on social relationships. Attempts to correct it result in behaviour that is 
maladaptive primarily due to social contexts and expectations. The ACC supports 
functioning and thriving in a complex social group, and is found in a comparable 
form only in highly intelligent species that also form complex social groups, such as 
apes and whales. The amygdala is crucial for social functioning as well, as 
demonstrated by the fact that people with abnormal functioning of the amygdala are 
frequently criminal psychopaths. Psychopathy is clearly a social disorder (clearly, 
based on its alternate name, sociopathy), as evidenced by the fact that the behaviours 
exhibited would not be disadvantageous outside of a social context. All this supports 
the idea that an entity that lacks the capacity for desire entirely would be incapable of 
functioning successfully in a social context. 
 
We now have a number of candidate tests that have some claim to correlate with the 
morally-relevant mental properties. It is not necessary to determine which is the 
“best” test for moral standing; in fact having several is a significant advantage. 
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Provided that all are significantly rigorous to not be passable too easily, we can have 
a sort of toolbox to allow for evaluation of entities that might not be testable for one 
or another of the tests, or that would be prone to failing one for arbitrary reasons. 
Some of the tests might prove to be too easy, which would be shown if, for instance, 
the types of programs and supercomputers we have currently but with more 
processing power and memory prove capable of passing. There is a danger, however, 
in having a tendency to have a knee-jerk, ad hoc reaction that as soon as a machine 
passes the test, we decide it must not have been a good test, making it impossible for 
machines to be granted moral standing and committing some kind of technological 
“no true Scotsman” fallacy. The fact that there is a degree of overlap in the types of 
desire, and having several tests for each, provides some safeguard against this. If 
performance on several of these tests is correlated, this would give some evidence 
that they are in fact good tests. Alternatively, if machines with questionable 
sophistication begin to consistently pass one of the tests without any attendant 
improvement in performance at any of the others, that would provide some evidence 
that this particular test might not be adequate. Thus this array of tests puts us in a 
much better position to have sufficient evidence for practical decision-making that 
an AI has moral standing than we were in before. 
 
It might be thought that current AI are actually approaching success at the kind of 
tasks in question. After all, machine learning algorithms and “reinforcement 
networks” have been among the most successful approaches to solving many 
complex problems.153 Reinforcement systems even use “reward signals” to achieve 
                                   
153 See, for instance, Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate 
Learning Machine Will Remake Our World (2015) for (perhaps slightly credulous) accounts of the 
success and promise of machine learning. 
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their learning. It might seem like it is only a matter of time before this approach 
succeeds at complex social tasks as well. If this is true, it might be evidence that 
either 1) modern AI have, or are approaching, phenomenal consciousness (which 
seems implausible), or 2) the criteria I have established do not in fact require 
phenomenal consciousness (and so are useless). However, it is not true that these AI 
are anywhere close to human levels of success at learning tasks, and any impression 
otherwise is due to excessively optimistic predictions and exaggerated claims. 
Machine learning has not actually achieved anywhere near the success of genuine 
reward-reinforcement learning in humans and non-human animals. The “reward” 
and “reinforcement” spoken of in modern AI research is purely metaphorical. 
 
In addition to many things that modern AI are thus far incapable of (such as 
representing causal relationships, making logical inferences, and parsing complex 
linguistic strings), even when it comes to the things the neural networks have 
managed to learn they are nowhere near the learning capacity of biological 
organisms. A human, or a dog, or a crow, can learn to recognize a stimulus from a 
very small number of exposures.154 Whether it’s a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand 
repetitions to learn an association or a concept, it is many orders of magnitude less 
than it takes learning algorithms, which require millions and millions of exposures to 
form successful rules. If an organism needed that many repetitions to learn, it would 
be doomed. If we are to have a fair competition, a true test of learning ability would 
have to be on the basis of an equal number of trials, and in such a scenario any 
                                   
154 For experiments with corvids, see Taylor et. al., “New Caledonian Crows Learn the Functional 
Properties of Novel Tool Types”, PLoS ONE 6(12) (2011) and Can Kabadayi and Mathias Osvath, 
“Ravens parallel great apes in flexible planning for tool-use and bartering”, Science 357 (2017). 
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modern AI would have no chance against even the simplest organism with the 
capacity to learn. 
 
Finally, even those things AI have managed to “learn”, they have not truly learned. 
Once humans or non-human animals have learned things in the sense I describe, 
they tend to retain it indefinitely. Neuroplasticity enables these things to become 
second-nature, and can be recalled at a moment’s notice even after not accessing it 
for an extended period. By contrast, AI learning networks suffer from what is known 
as “catastrophic interference”. Catastrophic interference, also known as catastrophic 
forgetting, is the tendency of trained AIs, which have meticulously formed 
associations from millions of exposures to data, to completely forget all this when 
exposed to new information.155 Humans can display somewhat similar interference 
patterns when doing the type of pattern-based learning that neural networks are 
capable of – which indeed shows that neural networks are not doing the right kind of 
learning. Even with this type of learning, however, studies have shown that humans 
do not exhibit nearly the same level of interference effects, and the forgetting is not 




                                   
155 See McCloskey, M. & Cohen, N, “Catastrophic interference in connectionist networks: The 
sequential learning problem”, In The Psychology of Learning and Motivation (1989) and Ratcliff, R., 
“Connectionist models of recognition memory: Constraints imposed by learning and forgetting 
functions”, Psychological Review 97 (1990). 
156 Lewandowsky S. “Gradual unlearning and catastrophic interference: a comparison of distributed 
architectures”, in Relating theory and data: essays on human memory in honor of Bennet B. 
Murdock (1991). 
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Chapter VI – Moral Implications 
 
1. A Note on the Moral Standing of Humans 
Now that we have established the criteria under which an AI would achieve moral 
standing, as well as which tasks are likely impossible without doing so, it is time to 
examine the practical consequences of this for our actions towards AI. But first, I 
would like to draw attention to an apparent implication of my views that affects not 
AI but humans, and might appear problematic: if people can have disorders of the 
kinds I have described, that diminish their capacity for desire, then (under at least 
some moral theories) they will come to have less moral importance than “normal” 
humans. Assigning different inherent moral importance to different humans, in 
particular on the basis of intrinsic properties like brain conditions, appears 
objectionable. This, however, is not as big a problem as it might seem. For one thing, 
there are other moral theories that give prominent importance to phenomenal desire 
that nonetheless don’t have this consequence. We need not adopt as our principle the 
maximisation of fulfilment of desires, and one could easily say that because humans 
are the type of things that have phenomenological desire and therefore moral 
standing, all members of the human race have equal moral standing in virtue of that 
fact, regardless of individual differences between them. If a specific type of AI were to 
become the sort of thing that has moral standing, even abnormal members of that 
type would thereby get moral standing. This would also not preclude granting moral 
standing to anomalous individual AIs that exhibit signs of having moral standing 
without being members of a type that exhibits those properties as a matter of course.  
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Another approach would be to say that treating people differently who have 
significant differences in their capacities for desire might be justified. It does not 
seem so strange to say that we ought to give a benefit to someone who can better 
appreciate it, all other things being equal, and it might be a waste to devote a good 
deal of resources to someone with these conditions in a way that isn’t aimed at 
alleviating or compensating for the conditions that prevent them from enjoying such 
benefits. We would do far more good by correcting symptoms of conditions such as 
depression, and we genuinely do less good by simply giving people things they desire 
faintly. The reason we frequently have more reason to satisfy the (weakened) desires 
of people with these conditions is that in general, all else is not equal. Since they will 
frequently be at lower levels of well-being, prioritarian intuitions, or avoidance of 
potential severe negative consequences of falling below a certain threshold, or even 
just diminishing marginal utility, will frequently favour helping these people satisfy 
their desires. But in a hypothetical situation where two people were equally happy, 
but one would derive far more pleasure from a certain good than the other, 
prioritising the person we can help more appears rational. On the other hand, 
anything that could make an enduring change in the other person’s capacity for 
desires would be given much greater importance, owing to its far-reaching long-term 
effects. 
 
Schroeder’s approach to this issue is to claim that, even if the desires he identifies 
have strong phenomenological components, we should not identify the strength of 
desires according to their phenomenological strength, but by their functional 
efficacy, precisely because of cases like the disorders we have considered. He 
presents the case of a man who suffers from depression and as a result has much 
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weaker feelings about things he cared about previously, such as his wife’s success. 
Schroeder asks: 
Need we hold that he cares less about his wife now than before? That he has 
fewer, or weaker, desires for her success? Normally, this is not held to be the 
case. Normally, one views a person who has become moderately depressed 
as not capable of appropriate feelings until the depression has lifted, rather 
than as having the appropriate feelings for one who now hardly cares what 
happens to his loved ones. Feelings are often taken to be the true measure of 
one’s desires, but in the case of depression, folk wisdom holds that a 
moderately depressed person is just temporarily unable to appreciate the 
things he does care about.157 
This, however, is not convincing. It seems just as plausible that people are being 
unreflective in their usage and would accept a paraphrase that their desires are 
diminished but it is not their fault, and is not indicative of their “true” self. Whether 
this new position is tenable and consistent with our judgments is unclear, but it 
frequently occurs that the folk make errors of this kind. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
see how any way to measure strength of desires will avoid this. The depressed man 
has significantly reduced motivation as well, and it seems reasonable to assume that 
his desires will be less efficacious in reinforcement learning under these 
circumstances. Thus, using only the phenomenological criterion to determine 
strength of desires can accommodate our intuitions at least as well as the 
competitors. 
 
                                   
157 Tim Schroeder, Three Faces of Desire (2004), p. 32 
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2: Considerations Against Creating AI Moral Patients 
We have established tests that function as criteria for having evidence that an AI has 
moral standing. We know, then, that in interactions with AI that pass these tests, we 
ought to treat them as though they might have moral standing. This is a 
straightforward practical result. We can now examine the question of what the 
consequences of this would be, and based on that when it would and would not be 
permissible to create such AI. 
 
One approach is to say that it would be better simply to avoid proliferating any sort 
of AI that could conceivably have moral standing. This would be possible now that we 
have sufficiently strict criteria for having potential moral standing. Without the tests 
we have established, there would be no obvious place to draw the line, no principled 
reason not to say that modern computers, capable of running programs that can pass 
limited Turing Tests, or even something as low-level as a smartphone, ought to be 
banned “just in case”. This of course would be an untenable state of affairs, 
significantly negatively affecting people’s lives. With our new criteria, only 
comparatively advanced AI would need to be avoided, not requiring us to roll back 
any of our current technological solutions, but only limiting what we do at some 
point in the future. 
 
There are several different ways such an intuition could be morally justified. Possibly 
the most straightforward is appeal to standard anti-natalist arguments. These 
include the claim that while pleasure is good and pain is bad, the absence of pain is 
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good but the absence of pleasure is not bad, unless there is some individual being 
deprived of pleasure.158 This leads to consequences such as: that we have a duty not 
to bring suffering individuals into existence but no commensurate duty to bring 
happy individuals into existence; that the fact that a being would suffer is a good 
reason to refrain from bringing it into existence but the fact that a being would be 
happy is not a good reason to bring it into existence; and that it is correct to regret 
creating an individual that suffers for the sake of that individual but it does not make 
sense to regret not creating a happy being for the sake of that being.159 These 
considerations will weigh in favour of refraining from creating AI.  
 
It is possible to resist the conclusion that these arguments determine that we should 
never bringing sentient beings into existence, but only provide more weight to the 
idea that we should avoid doing so when we cannot be certain that the balance of 
these beings’ experience will not weigh too strongly in favour of suffering over 
happiness.160 One could adopt an even stronger position and argue that as long as we 
can be sure that total well-being is increased, it would be right to bring more AI with 
the capacity for well-being into existence, or even that it might even be morally 
required, as it would be under some theories. There are concerns and debates about 
the morality of excessively creating even on-balance happy additional lives just as 
long as total well-being is increased, and there are increasingly calls to focus on 
“making people happy, not making happy people.”161 Even if we ignore those, 
                                   
158 David Benatar, “Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics”, Ethics 17 (2013) 
p. 122. 
159 Ibid., p. 123. 
160 See Aaron Smuts, “To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living”, Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2013). 
161 Jan Narveson is generally regarded as the originator of this (see “Moral Problems of Population”, 
The Monist 57[1] [1973] p. 80), which has been discussed a great deal since (see for instance Per 
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however, there is a distinct problem when it comes to AI, since it is uncertain 
whether we can ensure that AI have lives worth living. Even if we believe that an AI 
has phenomenal states that might be similar enough to our own to merit being 
granted moral standing, they would still have very different structure and 
composition to humans and non-human animals, and therefore likely very different 
needs and preferences. It would be extremely difficult to predict what it would take 
to ensure their flourishing and therefore uncertain whether it could be provided. 
Thus there would be a very real possibility that we would be bringing into existence 
entities whose lives are not worth living, which would be automatically wrong 
according to most moral theories and would likely come out wrong even on an 
unrestricted utilitarian theory. The fact that their level of suffering and pleasure will 
be very uncertain will disfavour creating AI more strongly than it does creating 
human beings. 
 
Scarcity of resources and environmental concerns should give us pause in bringing 
any entity into existence that will make these problems worse. Of course creating any 
computer or technology will consume resources and have environmental impacts, 
but the situation is exacerbated when the entity we are creating will have legitimate 
moral demands for resources itself such that we morally cannot deprive it of them, 
and will be obligated to ensure that its needs are met and cannot simply deactivate or 
recycle it. A general policy of not creating AI with potential moral standing is not 
much different from the calls to spay and neuter pets, or to limit human population 
growth, and is justified on the same grounds. 
                                   
Algander, "A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics", Res Publica 18[2] [2012], and Stuart 
Rachels, "Is It Good to Make Happy People?", Bioethics 12[2] [1998]). 
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Even if we can be certain AIs will have on balance good lives, there are arguments 
that could weigh in favour of not creating them that apply more strongly to AI than to 
human beings or non-human animals. Seana Shiffrin has provided a vivid example to 
illustrate how this can be the case: imagine a wealthy eccentric who elects to donate 
some of his wealth to a community of much less wealthy neighbours by means of 
throwing bricks of gold bullion from an airship.162 The people receiving the gold are 
sufficiently financially comfortable that they will not die or suffer severe harms 
without this extra wealth, but having it will benefit them greatly. Even for those who 
are injured by the falling bricks, the net effect on their lives will be positive (let us 
stipulate that there is no chance anyone will be killed or permanently debilitated in 
any way). Shiffrin argues that throwing the bricks was an immoral act, even if there 
was no safer way to confer this benefit and no way to secure consent in advance, 
because it caused harms without consent without averting significant harms. If one 
accepts that this is similar to the case of creating moral patient AIs with good lives, 
this would be an argument against creating any AI regardless of our prediction of 
how well their lives would go. Even if one does not accept this argument in the case 
of humans and disagrees that the case of human biological procreation is like this, 
there is better claim that this argument weighs against producing moral patient AIs. 
For AI, there is no recourse to claims such as that we merely “seek to […] engage in a 
time-honored practice”163 like when people decide to start a family. That could be 
argued to be a right that people have, and even an essential element of human 
                                   
162 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of 
Harm”, Legal Theory 5(2) (1999) p. 127. Shiffrin’s example uses a plane as the vehicle, but in addition 
to the greater practicality of using a slower—moving vehicle, this imagined character really feels more 
like a zeppelinist to me. 
163 Ibid., p. 128. 
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flourishing, such that engaging in it averts greater harms that outweigh whatever 
badness there is in procreating.164 There is no comparable deprivation of an essential 
element of human flourishing that is averted by creating AI, so that might not be 
justified even if procreation is justified. 
 
Another reason human procreation might be justified is that even if it causes 
inevitable harms, it is necessary to avert greater harms, such as the extinction of the 
human race. It seems intuitive (though is not uncontroversial) that such an outcome 
would be bad, and there have been many theories proposed as to why.165 Since no AI 
race exists, there can be no harm to one, and there is no harm from not bringing one 
into existence. We are under no obligation to create one any more than we are 
obligated to genetically engineer new species or to bring back the dinosaurs. 
 
Shiffrin also countenances a weaker argument, that an action like the gold 
“donation” might not be morally wrong, all things considered, as long as the person 
performing it takes responsibility for compensating any harms suffered. This would 
mean that creators of AI with moral standing would bear responsibility for their well-
being. This seems natural, but would mean that a significant burden is placed on 
people when such an AI is created, which affects the moral calculus. There is also a 
                                   
164 It is important to note, when it comes to discussions of the value of the parent/child relationship, 
that there is debate about whether raising one’s own biological child is a distinct good, or whether 
adoption is just as viable a means to the goods in question (see Tina Rulli, “The Unique Value of 
Adoption”, in Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges [2014] for discussion of these 
ideas). This is not particularly important, however, since it would still necessitate (and therefore 
justify) someone having children at some point, and the specific practical ethics of procreation in 
particular social contexts are not relevant to issues involving AI.  
165 See Johann Frick, “On the Survival of the Human Race”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47(2-3) 
(2017). 
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disanalogy with procreation here, because though parents take on significant 
burdens when having children, it is commonly believed that they are compensated 
with special goods. The role of parent is claimed to offer distinct benefits that cannot 
be achieved elsewhere that more than compensate for the significant burdens that 
come with it.166 When it comes to AI there is no special relationship or role in our 
society that could confer those goods, and it cannot answer any natural need in the 
way a parenthood relationship could. Might our society develop new beneficial social 
roles around AI? It’s possible, but does not seem like something we should count on. 
Therefore, creating excessive burdens with no appropriate compensation might be a 
reason to avoid creating AI with moral standing. 
 
There is the further complication that we are not even certain that AI we make that 
pass our tests and fulfill our criteria will even have genuine moral standing. It would 
be sufficiently likely that we ought to act as if it is the case, but it would be by no 
means guaranteed. Thus even if we ensure that we do everything we can to meet the 
needs of AI, it may turn out that they had no moral standing in the first place, and 
thus any burdens that were placed on humans, and sacrifices we made to the well-
being of humans or any other entity that genuinely has morally-relevant well-being, 
would turn out to be unjustified, since it was not accompanied by a greater increase 
in well-being for another entity, or indeed any increase in well-being, since the entity 
for whom it was performed had no actual level of well-being to affect. This is a 
problem unique to AI that we do not face when it comes to humans or other animals. 
                                   
166 See Sarah Hannan and R.J. Leland, “Childhood bads, parenting goods, and the right to procreate”, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21(3) (2018) for a discussion. 
 116 
 
3. Considerations In Favour of Creating AI Moral Patients 
The preceding arguments each could provide a pro tanto reason to not make any AI 
that meet our criteria for having potential moral standing. However, there can be 
other factors that override these reasons. If making AI that specifically pass our tests 
and thereby must be treated as having moral standing can produce sufficiently good 
results, the risks might be morally justified. This is a concern not often considered in 
the ethics literature: whether the positive effects of a being’s existence on others in 
general can have an impact on the morality of bringing that entity into existence. 
This is importantly different from the case where the child’s positive effect on the 
parents’ lives was considered, because that is a reciprocal relationship that the child 
is an integral part of, and can be achieved no other way. Any positive effects AI have 
for people will be independent from any possible benefits people would provide to 
these AIs, and will be generic effects that could in principle be achieved in different 
ways with no necessary connection to AI (even if those other ways might not be 
feasible in practice). Can bringing entities into existence just to benefit others be 
justified? This is frequently not examined when it comes to population ethics, 
possibly on the basis of the (probably justified) belief that any additional people will 
on average be about as good at providing whatever goods people provide to others as 
the people who are already around, and that people’s demands and outputs will tend 
to equal out and that there will be little to no inherent benefit to a larger population 
beyond a fairly low level. We can of course not guarantee that any additional humans 
will tend to have a positive effect and make things better for others, but the case is 
not the same when it comes to AI. Since AIs can have significantly different abilities 
and skills than humans, their presence could help society significantly if we 
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deliberately create AI that excel in specific areas where we have a deficiency of 
competence. 
 
Let us assume, for argument’s sake, that some combination of the aforementioned 
concerns about creating moral patient AIs provide sufficient prima facie reason to 
refrain from creating them. Now, what if AIs with those properties would make the 
lives of currently-existing people sufficiently better? Would that overcome the 
considerations against creating them? When presented with this question, it might 
be natural to recoil at the prospect of using sentient beings as a means to an end like 
this, possibly due to imagining a case like that described by William James,167 later 
memorably referenced by Ursula LeGuin in the story “The Ones Who Walk Away 
From Omelas”.168 This is a situation where a utopia is achieved through the immense 
suffering of a single individual. This appears abhorrent to most people. As James 
says, “even though an impulse arose within us to clutch at the happiness so offered, 
how hideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as the fruit 
of such a bargain?”169 It might be thought the situation is little better when an 
underclass of a large number of individuals is subjected to mild-to-moderate 
suffering to maintain a higher standard of well-being for others. This does however 
more closely resemble many societies throughout history and up to the present day, 
which might be evidence it is more palatable to people, but the actual existence of 
such syFdstems when there are no Omelas-style systems is due only to the 
impracticality of focusing the suffering so intensely, not because it is considered 
                                   
167 William James. "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", in The Will to Believe and other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy (1919). 
168 In Ursula LeGuin, The Wind's Twelve Quarters (1975). 
169 William James. “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life”, in The Will to Believe and other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy (1919), p. 188. 
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better to spread it out. It is clear that we should feel as much disapprobation towards 
the institution of slavery in America that enabled the functioning of that society, or to 
the existence of dalits under the Indian caste system, even if the systems included 
more overall happiness than had generations of those people never existed, even if 
most of those people had lives that were on balance worth living. But there are still 
some differences when it comes to AI. For one thing, the AI case need not be a case 
where we are knowingly and deliberately subject entities to suffering, we can create 
AI and do our best to attend to their moral standing, even if some of them wind up 
with lives not worth living (if they reliably prove to have lives not worth living, there 
might not be much difference if we continue to create them). Even if we have the 
intuition that it would have been better had African slaves brought to America not 
reproduced and died out after a generation, this might be influenced by relevant 
alternatives, such as the original enslaved people remaining in Africa and subsequent 
generations living there, or of the descendants of people brought to America not 
being subjected to horrific oppression and having better lives than they did under the 
system of slavery. If AI have an intrinsic nature such that a given generation of them 
cannot exist without having a level of well-being significantly below that of humans 
in society, and will increase human well-being significantly, this is relevantly 
different to a case where we could easily treat an underclass better and promote 
greater equality even at the cost of overall happiness. Thus even if we cannot be sure 
AI will be equally happy as humans, creating them might be justified. 
 
This will depend heavily on specific applications of AI technology and whether 
passing the tests is crucial to success at these applications. It is clear that we should 
avoid frivolous uses of AI with social and moral competence. It might seem desirable 
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to have digital assistant programs (such as Siri, Alexa, and Cortana), for example, be 
as socially and morally adept as possible, but it is obvious that the benefits of this 
application do not outweigh the risks. A little inconvenience and frustration is a 
small price to pay to avoid the significant moral hazards that would result from 
potentially giving such AIs moral standing. 
 
There are, however, cases where having an AI be as socially and morally competent 
as possible is a significant benefit, where there is more at stake than having an 
intuitive and pleasant user interface for some unimportant program. One case of this 
would be military applications. Under the assumption that governments will conduct 
military operations, maximally socially and morally competent robots might be able 
to minimise exposure to harm from these actions. For any automated military robots 
to be used in combat zones, especially those with lethal capabilities, having 
maximally sophisticated moral capabilities would be vital. However, the fact that an 
AI that was maximally adept at these duties would have a strong possibility of having 
moral standing removes a lot of the benefit of using such machines in the first place. 
A significant reason for having military robots is to keep human soldiers, who would 
otherwise be the ones to perform dangerous tasks, out of harm’s way. If giving 
autonomous robots significant moral reasoning capabilities would also mean that 
they would have claim to moral standing themselves, we do not gain any significant 
advantage by placing them into harm’s way instead, and thus expanding the 
purposes for which they are used into areas that require more moral competence 
might not be morally justified.  
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It might be thought that if we can create AI that is not only equal to humans in moral 
reasoning ability, but exceeds our own capacities, then we might achieve such 
superior results that it would justify the inherent moral risks. Indeed, if we could 
make an AI that we were sure would make significantly better moral decisions than 
the average human in situations where as much is at stake as the military situations 
in question, that would be a very significant moral benefit and could outweigh a lot of 
potential harms. However, it is very dubious that such a thing would be possible. For 
an AI to be significantly “better” than moral reasoning than humans would imply 
that its judgements frequently diverge from those of humans, and any case where 
that occurred it would likely not be recognised as morally superior but assumed to be 
morally deficient – for good reason, since that is the more likely explanation. This 
cannot be resolved by the judgement of “moral experts”, since the very possibility of 
such a thing is highly controversial at minimum.170 It might be suggested that the 
problem is not that the people making moral decisions in combat situations are 
incapable of making the correct judgements, but that they make the wrong decisions 
in the moment based on inappropriate emotional responses and in a moment of calm 
reflection they and most other people would be able to see what was actually the right 
decision. If this is the case, it is possible that an AI could be better at this in a way we 
would recognise – but there is no reason to think that we would succeed in creating 
an AI that can do this. There is no evidence for the assumption that it would be 
feasible to make an AI that is capable of processing various emotions but is better 
able to weigh and balance and attend to the right ones for the right situations than 
the average human. That seems like an incredibly difficult task, and unless we have a 
better idea of how to accomplish it, it would be unjustified to produce AI that have 
                                   
170 See for instance A.J. Ayer, “The Analysis of Moral Judgments”, in Philosophical Essays (1954), and 
C.D. Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosophy (1953). 
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some claim to moral standing in order to experiment on how to make them better at 
situational moral judgement. 
 
Another case that might justify the use of AI that are well-being subjects is medical 
applications. T0 automate more of the operations of a hospital, and for AI to take on 
more of the roles of doctors and nurses, they would need to be reliably capable of 
making correct moral decisions. Once again, this is a case where lives are at stake, 
and so taking on a good deal of moral risk could be justified by good enough 
outcomes. But once again, some of the reasons AI automation of some of these roles 
is thought to be desirable would disappear if the AI in question had a claim to moral 
standing. Doctors and nurses are frequently required to work long, gruelling hours, 
and having AI take over some of their duties would allow them to be freed from some 
of the stress and improving their health, emotional well-being, and opportunities for 
leisure and a social life. However, if the AI also have well-being that we are required 
to account for, we could not simply have these machines work round the clock and 
would have to ensure those things for the AI as well, therefore not making AI much 
different functionally as a solution than simply training and hiring more doctors and 
nurses. It might be thought that creating AI capable of performing the complex 
medical tasks and procedures as well as making the correct moral decisions would be 
faster than the many years of education required to train medical professionals. 
However, it is unlikely that there is any shortage of people who would be able and 
willing to perform jobs in the medical field given the opportunity, and if funding for 
medical education and hiring medical personnel were increased today it would only 
take a few years to see the effects, and as long as the pipeline was maintained the 
delays would not be felt thereafter. It would likely take much longer to design AI that 
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can perform all the duties of medical professionals, leaving the only possible benefit a 
faster response to elastic demand, something not likely to often come up to a great 
extent in the medical field. The only way the AI solution would be clearly justified is 
if designing, building, and maintaining these AIs was significantly cheaper in terms 
of resources than simply training and hiring more doctors and nurses. This is 
doubtful. Furthermore, if we can make AI that can perform the complicated technical 
aspects of medical procedures without giving them the ability to make moral 
decisions, we could have humans perform the moral decision-making with far less 
specialised training, allowing for hiring more of them for less demanding work, and 
allowing them to make the decisions while less fatigued and stressed, leading to 
better outcomes in a more certain and straightforward way without introducing the 
moral hazards and uncertainties of having potentially conscious AI. 
 
Another possible use of socially and morally competent AI is monitoring and 
moderation of online communication, such as social media. Current attempts to use 
algorithms to identify and remove hate speech, threats, and other harmful speech 
have worked poorly, with many false positives and false negatives both.171 This 
speech is genuinely harmful and has many negative effects, and while it is not as 
invariably a matter of life and death as military and medical applications (though 
people’s health and safety is genuinely threatened in many cases), its effects are more 
                                   
171 For an illustration of this, see Joseph Cox and Jason Koebler, “Why Won’t Twitter Treat White 
Supremacy Like ISIS? Because It Would Mean Banning Some Republican Politicians Too”, 
Motherboard Tech by Vice (April 25 2019), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3xgq5/why-wont-
twitter-treat-white-supremacy-like-isis-because-it-would-mean-banning-some-republican-
politicians-too In essence, Twitter employees have claimed that for an AI algorithm to succeed in 
banning the terrorist group ISIS from Twitter, it needed to be set in a way that it would also ban many 
innocent Muslims and Arabic-language media. The algorithm fails to ban many neo-Nazis because to 
increase its sensitivity any higher would cause it to ban Republican members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and Senate. 
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widespread compared to the relatively small percentage of the world population 
directly affected by war. For this reason, the total amount of harm mitigated might 
merit taking on additional moral responsibility by creating AI with moral standing. 
This work also clearly requires a deep understanding of social nuance and the limits 
of what is moral or immoral, necessitating a very complex AI. In addition, the work 
itself would not be as gruelling or dangerous as military or medical work, and so 
having an AI with moral standing do the job would not be so inherently morally 
problematic. However, once again, there seems little reason to prefer AI performing 
these tasks to paying more humans to do it unless it was significantly more efficient 
and cost-effective. While using simple algorithms that can be set to run constantly 
and then forgotten about is much cheaper than employing humans to check 
manually, using AI that themselves need to be treated as subjects of moral concern 
would add extra costs that might not make it any more efficient. 
 
A final note: it might be argued that, since we would have complete control over the 
programming of any AI we create, the concerns about being able to meet their needs 
and maintain a sufficient level of well-being for them are not such a big problem, 
since we can control their desires and dispositions and ensure that they are easy 
enough to meet. Even putting them in roles that are very bad for humans might not 
be a problem, since we can ensure that they do not have the same fears and aversions 
that make those jobs undesirable to begin with. First, it might not be so easy to 
control something so complex in a predictable way. We should not overestimate our 
ability to make subtle tweaks to these properties while maintaining full functionality. 
It also seems like it would be far easier to control the outward signs of what is 
contributing to the AI’s well-being than to control the actual internal factors, and so 
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we might be merely deceiving ourselves into thinking the AI are doing well. But, 
more importantly, even if we can control such factors, it is not obvious that it is 
permissible to do so in any way we like. Imagine a situation where a group of people 
will be required to spend a lifetime doing filthy, unpleasant work cleaning up 
something that, left unchecked, would have a catastrophic environmental impact. 
While the contaminant is not directly harmful to them, they will have to live and 
work in filth and squalor their entire lives, and will inevitably be looked-down on by 
much of society. Would it be correct to genetically-engineer a race of people that 
enjoy living in squalor and being degraded, since the work is necessary anyway? It 
seems natural to feel that there is something wrong with that. There is no clear 
reason to think it should be any different with a morally-important AI than with 
organic beings. We are therefore left with important questions about what would be 
appropriate when it comes to how we program such AI. 
 
We have established that there are very good reasons to avoid making AI that might 
possess moral standing, and very few if any contexts where it would be justified to do 
so. AI research should stop short of producing any AI that have analogues of desire-
phenomenology and the sophisticated social and moral competences that would 
enable, at least until we can be far more sure of our abilities to deal with it in an 
ethical manner. 
